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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
International relations has been altered by the recent resurgence of the 
European Community. The Single European Act in 1987 and the 1992 internal 
market deadline are indicators that the member states of the European 
Community are serious about going beyond the Treaty of Rome and 
coordinating many other formerly national policy areas. 
This new growth phase has been predicted by many observers. Keohane 
and Hoffmann write, "There seems little doubt that European institutions will 
continue to become stronger and more encompassing...and the institutions of 
the European Community in particular, will play the leading role in providing 
finance, investment, markets, and political guidance for the Eastern European 
countries whose politics enable them to become linked closely to Western 
capitialism."! 
The resurgence of the European Community (EC) as an economic leader 
in global relations is clear. Today the EC has a combined population of 345 
million people in twelve member states, or approximately 6.5% of the total 
world population. The EC had an annual budget in 1991 of European Currency 
Units (ECU) 55.6 billion, or approximately $65.61 billion dollars above and 
beyond the individual national budgets of member states. In terms of global 
1 Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s," 
in The New European Community: Decision-Making and Institutional Change, eds. 
Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1991), 9. 
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market shares, in 1989 the EC had a gross domestic product (GDP) of ECU 
4407 billion, compared to ECU 4658 billion for the United States and ECU 
2560 billion for Japan. This translates into the EC having 20 percent of the 
world market in goods and services, on both the imports and exports side. 
Average imports and exports for the EC were approximately 12.2 percent of the 
EC's GDP, compared to 10.3 percent for the United States, and 10.7 percent for 
Japan.2 
The end of the Cold War and a world dominated by two superpowers has 
signaled the ever-increasing importance of economic prowess. The previous 
view that military concerns alone constitute high politics is changing. As a 
result, the expanding role of the European Community within its member states 
may have a resounding effect throughout the international arena as the 
economic power consolidated in the Community increases. The importance of 
the Community is even more compelling when one considers the disintegration 
of the Eastern Bloc and the possible addition of many new members. In 
addition, the end of the Cold War has caused some previously neutral countries 
to reconsider their relationship with the EC. For example, Austria, and Finland 
have both applied for full membership in the Community with accession 
negotiations beginning in January of 1993.3 The increased importance of 
economic security and the potential for increased EC membership justify 
7 Eurostat. 3rd ed., (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Community, 1992), 41-232. 
3 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1992), 378. 
3 
research to determine whether the Community is indeed becoming more 
integrated. 
Within the institutional framework of the Community, the Court of 
Justice has seldom been the focus of scholarly efforts. The purpose of the 
European Court of Justice is to ensure that Community law is observed in the 
interpretation and application of the establishing Treaties and the laws adopted 
by the Community's Council and Commission. Described as an "integrating 
factor of the highest order," the Court is responsible for defining the principles 
on which the Community legal order rests.4 It is this unique role that makes the 
Court an appropriate metaphor for the European Community overall. The 
functions and jurisdiction of the Court mirror the functions and jurisdiction of 
the Community. European Community growth and increased integration have 
not yet been studied from the perspective of the Court. The Community's Court 
of Justice is ideally suited for this research because of its pervasive role in the 
Community. This is a study of the European Community's Court of Justice as a 
metaphor for change in the Community. The following set of unobtrusive 
indicators will be used in order to measure the level of integration of the Court; 
the number of issue areas addressed by the Court, the number of non¬ 
government plaintiffs bringing cases to the Court, and the number of both cases 
heard, and preliminary rulings issued, by the Court. The issue areas within the 
Court's competence will provide an indication of the areas in which the Court is 
active and will identify any new areas in which the Court has or is becoming 
active. This will indicate if the Court’s jurisdiction is expanding into new issue 
4 Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, The ABC of Community Law (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Community, 1991), 21. 
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areas. By analyzing the number of non-government plaintiffs, (either EC 
institutions or individual citizens), we can determine if the Court is considered 
legitimate and therefore useful, in the minds of these plaintiffs. The number of 
cases heard by the Court will serve as an initial indicator of the utilization of the 
Court and will help signify the extent to which it is considered legitimate. The 
number of preliminary hearings issued by the Court will also serve as a measure 
of Court legitimacy. If the national courts of member states consider the 
European Court of Justice a legitimate and/or useful institution, they will appeal 
for preliminary rulings more often. 
The term integration can be defined either as a process or an outcome. 
Here, integration is defined as a process rather than an outcome. In doing so, 
the need for establishing an integration threshold should be avoided. Instead, 
the Court’s current level of integration will be compared to past levels of 
integration to determine whether the Community is more or less integrated 
today. 
Before beginning an analysis of the European Court of Justice today, it is 
necessary to establish the theoretical foundation of the study of integration as it 
relates to the Court. Chapter Two reviews the different schools of integration 
theory and past efforts at analyzing the European Community. The second part 
of this chapter attempts to classify the European Community in a typology of 
international actors. What we expect to see the EC develop into is distorted by 
how we interpret the EC today. Therefore, it is critical to understand how we 
interpret the EC so we can account for this distortion. 
Chapter Three is a discussion of the historical background of the 
European Community and the Court of Justice. It reviews the evolution of the 
5 
EC from its conceptual birth to its current state. The expansion of the EC by 
additional treaties and the gradual geographical expansion of the EC are 
observed. A description of the structure and institutions of the Communities is 
also provided. The evolution of the Court and its purpose and relationship to 
the other EC institutions is discussed. The establishment of the supremacy and 
direct effect doctrines by the Court is analyzed, as is the internal structure of the 
Court and the newly functioning Court of First Instance. The chapter ends with 
a brief discussion of the role others have suggested the Court plays in EC 
integration. 
An elaboration of the research question and methodology underlying this 
study constitutes Chapter Four. The data source, and specifically the data 
utilized here, is examined. The concept of integration is further defined as a 
function of both the Court's scope and domain, and the indicators chosen to 
measure both are detailed. Lastly, the possible results of this analysis of the 
indicators are briefly considered. 
Chapter Five consists of an interpretation and analysis of the data and 
findings in terms of the definition of integration as a function of the Court's 
scope and domain. Whether the Court is growing in scope and/or domain will 
be assessed by combining the results of the indictors. Also, a sense of the 
influences on the indicators will be gained by examining some of the events in 
the evolution of the Community that may have affected the Court. 
Chapter Six reviews the findings of this study and draws conclusions 
from it. Direct implications of the study for the Court of Justice and the 
European Community will be assessed. The chapter also includes an evaluation 
of the broader implications of the study for international relations, and 
6 
integration and international relations theory. Finally, some related areas for 
further research will be discussed. 
7 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND 
Theories of Integration 
In this chapter some of the different schools of integration theory will be 
discussed in relation to the EC. There are various schools of integration theory, 
most of which have theoretical roots that predispose their advocates to certain 
classifications of the European Community. Consequently this discussion of 
integration theories will include an analysis of the varying theories and their 
expectations for the future of the European Community. The anticipated 
outcomes serve as core assumptions on which many integration process theories 
are based. Four main schools of thought comprise the major approaches to EC 
integration: federalism, communications theory, functionalism, and 
neofunctionalism. 
Federalism focuses on the formative stages of the integration process and 
emphasizes the formal establishment of constitutions, treaties, and other critical 
decisions.^ The distribution of rights and obligations between the different 
levels of government and among the different branches of government are 
important elements in the federalist equation. Political, rather than economic or 
social, factors are most crucial to federalist integration theories. These factors 
serve as measures of state-building.6 The eventual state of the European 
5 Raymond F. Hopkins and Richard W. Mansbach, eds., Structure and Process in 
International Politics (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973), 285. 
6 Barry B. Hughes, "Delivering the Goods: European Integration and the Evolution of 
Complex Governance." Paper prepared for the American Political Science Annual 
Meeting, Washington, D.C. August 1991, 1. 
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Community, according to federalist theory, would be a fully developed nation¬ 
state with a division of sovereign powers between the Community government 
and the member states. This has not yet happened. There still remains a "hard 
core of sovereignty" in areas such as "defence, foreign affairs, monetary and (to 
a lesser extent) fiscal policies," demonstrating a "crucial difference between the 
European System(s), where sovereign powers remain in the purview of the 
states, and the classical federations, where sovereign powers are (as a rule) 
centralized. "7 
Communications theory links social and economic factors with political 
outcomes. The focus is on preconditions and process factors that are either 
social or economic, such as interstate communication and trade flows. These 
factors create "in-groups" where members are more inclined to work together 
than with others outside the group.8 The advocates of this approach suggest 
that increased transactions within a group enhance the likelihood of further 
integration by encouraging mutually responsive behavior through learning.9 
Karl Deutsch, a pioneer in this area, stresses the necessity that a sense of 
community exist among the people, as a measure of nation-building. This sense 
of common loyalty would include a "shared we-feeling sufficient to persuade 
7 Renaud Dehousse and Joseph H.H. Weiler, "The Legal Dimension," in The Dynamics of 
European Integration, eds. Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman (New York: 
Pinter Publishers, 1990), 252. 
8 Hopkins, Structure and Process in International Politics. 282. 
9 Ibid., 283. 
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groups and citizens to accept recurrent and structural sacrifices of their interests 
in the furtherance of the interests of others or of the system as a whole." 10 
The anticipated outcome of the integration process, according to Deutsch, 
is a "security community" that can resolve disputes peacefully in most 
instances, but does not need to have a "high level of interdependence or central 
political organizations to enforce joint decisions." 11 If the predictions of 
communications theorists were to prove accurate, the European Community 
would become a security community and would not require the centralized 
Community institutions. If so, the European Community would develop a true 
sense of community where, for example, citizens would not consider 
themselves French or German or British, but European. 
William Wallace distinguishes between formal and informal integration. 
Formal integration emphasizes "those changes in the framework of rules and 
regulations which encourage— or inhibit, or redirect— informal flows. Formal 
integration is discontinuous: it proceeds decision by decision, bargain by 
bargain, treaty by treaty." Informal integration stresses "those intense patterns 
of interaction which develop without the impetus of deliberate political 
decisions, following the dynamics of markets, technology, communications 
networks, and social change...a continuous process, a flow..." 12 These 
10 Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb, eds. Policy-Making in the European 
Community (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 420. 
11 Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1957); Quoted in Hopkins. Structure and Process in International Politics 
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973), 283. 
12 William Wallace, Introduction to The Dynamics of European Integration. William 
Wallace, ed. (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 9. 
10 
definitions serve to emphasize the different foci of integration theories. 
Federalism is considered formal integration while communications theory is an 
example of informal integration. 
Functionalist integration theory, like communications theory, emphasizes 
social and economic factors as preconditions and process mechanisms that 
create common interests. I3 Functionalism is based on economic theories of 
supply and demand. If nation-states are unable to provide certain services and 
goods to their citizens, new levels of organization will be established for the 
purpose of providing those goods and services. For example, environmental 
problems like air pollution are not contained by state borders. Economic 
recessions also cross national borders, linking economic conditions in one 
country to economic conditions in another. Asa result, regional and 
international organizations like the European Community have been established 
to address these geographically diffuse problems. Functionalists believe that, 
with the creation of each new regional or international organization, a ripple 
effect will increase the organization's functional scope and capacity by linking 
issue areas. 14 This ripple effect is not automatic. It only continues until the 
minimum amount of cooperation and coordination necessary exists. As a result, 
organizations like the European Community reach growth plateaus where the 
status quo is accepted and a "zone of indifference" not necessitating further 
13
 Ibid., 283. 
14 Ibid., 283. 
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integration is established. 15 Consequently, functionalists argue, the theory is 
not a "frontal attack" on nation-states or their sovereignty. 16 
This approach to integration theory focuses on institution-building. In 
terms of Wallace's distinction between formal and informal integration, 
functionalism stresses the discontinuity of the formal integration processes. 
The European Community would be expected to continue to grow in functional 
scope, according to the functionalists, through growth spurts, rather than 
through an unstopable and ongoing process. 
Both communications theory and functionalism serve as the theoretical 
foundation for neofunctionalism. The dynamics of international organizations 
and institution-building are emphasized by neofunctionalists. These theorists 
argue that within the international agency, there are internal pressures for 
expansion not triggered by external factors. 17 In organizations created 
expressly for the purpose of economic unions or common markets there may 
also be "pressures for broadening or strengthening their own authority." 18 First 
articulated by Ernst B. Haas, this neofunctionalism differs from the original "in 
that it establishes some prerequisites to effective problem-solving which 
involve a partial but direct threat to the autonomy of the nation-state. 
Specifically, it is argued that one must begin with a real delegation of decision- 
15 Ibid., 284. 
16 Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 7. 
17 Hopkins, Structure and Process in International Politics. 284. 
18 Ibid., 284. 
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making authority to a supranational agency." 19 Lindberg and Scheingold 
explain, "It was certainly consistent with the neofunctionalist image to think in 
terms of a new kind of system that may transform the nation-state but not 
replace it."20 Neofunctionalists, however, do not stress an inevitable and 
unstoppable increase in the scope of the supranational organization. Zones of 
indifference are acknowledged as part of the integration process by 
+ 
Degree of 
Authority 
Figure 1: Potential integration paths^l 
19 Lindberg, Europe's Would-Be Polity. 7. 
20 Ibid., 24. 
21 The diagram is an adaptation of a similar diagram by Philippe C. Schmitter. Philippe C. 
Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration," International Organization, 
24 (Autumn 1970): 845. 
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neofunctionalists .22 
The above diagram illustrates the potential paths of growth and 
degeneration in a political community. The core of neofunctionalism is Haas' 
concept of "spillover," where spillover is "a prosaic result of 'swapping 
concessions from a variety of sectors."23 Restated by Hopkins and Mansbach, 
spillover exists when areas with which the central agency deals expand and the 
authority of its decisions increase.24 Similarly, "spill around" occurs when new 
areas of interest exist but there is no increase in decisional authority.25 
Neofunctionalist theory suggests that the European Community will 
continue to grow in both scope and domain, but with intermittent zones of 
indifference. Periods of retrenchment, characterized by increases in degree of 
authority, but in fewer issue areas, and periods of spillback, characterized by 
decreases in both degree and scope of authority, are possible. Also possible are 
periods of increased scope but with decreased decisional authority, called 
"muddling about," and periods of unchanging scope with increasing decisional 
authority, called "build up." 
These four schools of thought comprise the major approaches to 
European Community integration. The predictions of the federalists and the 
22 Hopkins, Structure and Process in International Politics. 285. 
23 Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 243; quoted in 
Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, "Conclusions: Community Politics and 
Institutional Change," in The Dynamics of European Integration, ed. William Wallace 
(New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 285. 
24 Hopkins, Structure and Process in International Politics. 285. 
25 Ibid., 285. 
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communications theorists do not appear likely, at least in the forseeable future. 
Functionalist and neofunctionalist theories seem more plausible given what is 
known about the Community thus far. The focus on institution-building and 
economic and social processes through the concepts of spillover and zones of 
indifference has proven insightful. 
Classifying the European Community 
In asking whether an entity is becoming more or less integrated, there is a 
certain expectation as to what that entity will become. This is why so much 
integration literature about the European Community has focused on the 
problem of classifying the European Community. A number of possible 
international actor categories have been found, but a consensus as to which 
category is most accurate is still not established. It is appropriate to begin this 
section of the thesis with an examination of some of the most common 
categorizations, because they illustrate the outcomes anticipated by integration 
theorists. 
Many theorists consider the European Community a federalist state. 
Most of these advocates argue that while the EC is not a federalist state yet, its 
structure and purpose best fit that of a potential state. The founding treaties 
serve as a constitution in which the duties and obligations are divided between 
the member states and the Community. The superiority of Community law over 
the laws of member states is also often cited as evidence of a federalist state. 
This classification, however, is generally not accepted as the most accurate 
assessment of the EC. Borchardt, for example, stresses that the Community is 
15 
not a federalist state because it "lacks both the universal jurisdiction 
characteristic of a state and the power to create new fields of competence."26 
Similar conclusions have been reached by Keohane and Hoffmann.27 
The Community is often described as an "international regime." The 
generally accepted definition of a regime, articulated by Krasner, is "sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations."28 The European Community appears to fit into this definition, but, 
as Keohane explains, these principles, norms, rules, and procedures "imply 
obligations even though these obligations are not enforceable through a 
hierarchical legal system."29 It is here that this categorization is incomplete. 
The legal structure of the European Community distinguishes it from other 
regimes. The ability to impose obligations on member states and to enforce 
those obligations if necessary sets the EC apart from regimes as they are usually 
defined (i.e., by Krasner). 
The next possible category identifies the European Community as an 
international organization. Keohane and Nye write that international 
organizations are viewed "not as sources of definitive law, but as 
institutionalized policy networks, within which transgovemmental policy 
26
 Ibid., 9. 
22
 Keohane. The New European Community. 10. 
28 Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables," International Organization 36 (Spring 1982): 185. 
29 Robert O.Keohane, After Hegemony. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), 59. 
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coordination and coalition building could take place."30 They reach this 
conclusion while delineating models of regime change. The European 
Community is appropriately described as an organization of institutionalized 
networks for the policy coordination of member states, but the EC does have a 
source of definitive law. It is the Court of Justice and the Community's 
accompanying legal system that distinguishes the EC from other international 
organizations. As explained by Keohane and Hoffmann, the European 
Community has gone beyond the limitations inherent in international 
organizations, in part because the Community legal process has a dynamic of its 
own and because the Community has gained limited sovereignty in some issue 
areas.31 
The European Community does not adequately fit any of the categories 
discussed above. It is neither a federal state, nor a regime, nor an international 
organization. In fact, in trying to identify the Community, there is little else left 
with which to compare it. Consequently, many have created a new category 
custom-made to address the uniqueness of the Community. As Michael 
Burgess writes: it is "conventional wisdom to describe the EC as sui generis... a 
unique state congruent with European needs and requirements."32 While this 
new classification has been generally accepted it does not relate the 
characteristics of the European Community directly to those of other 
international actors. 
30 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence. 2nd ed. (Glenview, 
Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), 256. 
3^ Keohane. The New European Community. 11-13. 
32 Michael Burgess. Federalism and European Union (New York: Routledge, 1989), 18. 
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Some have sought to relate further the unique characteristics of the 
European Community to the other categories. In doing so the concept of 
supranationality, as defined by Ernst B. Haas, has also been accepted as an 
accurate assessment of the Community. Supranationality is defined as a 
"cumulative pattern of accommodation in which the participants refrain from 
unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by 
means of compromises upgrading common interests."33 Borchardt concurs, 
noting that the EC is an "association endowed with independent authority, with 
its own sovereign rights and a legal order independent of the Member States to 
which both the Member States and their citizens are subject in matters for 
which the Community is competent."34 in addition, Renaud Dehousse and 
Joseph H.H. Weiler point out that the term 'supranationality' was coined 
expressly for the purpose of identifying the unique status of the Community.35 
In this sense, both terms sui generis and supranationality reinforce the same 
point by connoting similar EC characteristics. 
An attempt at further identifying the European Community by Keohane 
and Hoffmann has led to the development of the concept of "pooled 
sovereignty."36 in discussing the Single European Act and its potential 
revitalization of the Community, the two have described the growth of the EC 
53 Ernst B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," ed. Stephen R. Graubard 
in A New Europe? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964) 64,66; cited in Robert O. 
Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, The New European Community: Decision-Making 
and Institutional Change (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 15. 
34 Borchardt, Community Law. 9. 
35 Dehousse "The Legal Dimension," 250. 
36 Keohane, The New European Community. 7. 
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as an "increase in the practice of pooling sovereignty," meaning "sharing 
decision-making capabilities through a qualified majority rule. "37 Keohane and 
Hoffmann explain that the Community is an "experiment in pooling 
sovereignty, not in transferring it from states to supranational institutions."38 
The concept of pooled sovereignty is not incompatible with Haas’s notion 
of supranationality. "The European Community can best be viewed as a set of 
complex overlapping networks, in which a supranational style of decision¬ 
making, characterized by compromises upgrading common interests, can under 
favourable conditions lead to the pooling of sovereignty."39 Keohane and 
Hoffmann stress that the European Community rests on intergovernmental 
bargains like the Single European Act.40 it is through these intergovernmental 
bargains that sovereignty is pooled in order to address specific functional areas 
of interest. 
This new description of the European Community is further elaborated by 
the identification of complex, overlapping networks originally discussed here in 
reference to Keohane and Nye's international organization model of regime 
change.41 This conceptualization is consistent with the classification of a 
network form of organization suggested by sociologists, "in which units are 
37 Ibid., 7. 
38 Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, "Conclusions: Community politics and 
institutional change," in The Dynamics of European Integration, ed. William Wallace 
(New York: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 277. 
39 Ibid., 277. 
40 Keohane, The New European Community. 10. 
41 Keohane, Power and Interdependence. 58. 
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defined not by themselves but in relation to other units."42 Keohane and 
Hoffmann explain that the concept of a network is "more of a metaphor than a 
theory" in that it "helps to emphasize the horizontal ties that exist among actors 
and the complexity of their relationships, but it does not elaborate clear 
hypotheses about behaviour. "43 
In 1975 Haas applied this network concept to the European Community 
and specifically described it as a "semi-lattice" form of organization, where 
"[t]here is a clear centre of authority for some activities and decisions, but not 
for all. Lines of authority duplicate and overlap; tasks are performed in 
fragments by many sub-systems; sometimes authority flows sideways and 
upwards, at other times the flow is downward."44 Part of the definition posited 
by Keohane and Hoffmann is this semi-lattice form "between a hierarchy and a 
simple matrix."45 This categorization of the European Community is a more 
accurate description than the previously mentioned categorizations and a more 
detailed account of those characteristics unique to the Community. 
Another classification similar to that elaborated by Keohane and 
Hoffmann is provided by Barry B. Hughes, in his paper "Delivering the Goods: 
European Integration and the Evolution of Complex Governance." Hughes 
suggests a link between the concepts of complex interdependence and 
^2 Keohane, "Conclusions: Community Politics," 281. 
43
 Ibid., 282. 
44
 Ernst B. Haas, "Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence 
and the Construction of International Regimes," International Organization 29 
(Summer 1975): 856. 
43
 Keohane, The New European Community. 14. 
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integration theory. This new approach, called complex governance, focuses on 
the linkages between complex interdependence and integration theory.46 "This 
view suggests that governance of Europe in the future will consist of multi¬ 
tiered, geographically overlapping structures of government..."47 While the 
phrase complex interdependence is new to integration theory, the underlying 
conceptual linkages are not. This sort of "structural future" was earlier 
described by Hopkins and Mansbach when they predicted that the future 
international system would consist of a "complex, multi-leveled, but fragmented 
set of actors with overlapping and conflicting goals."48 in fact, Hughes cites 
Lindberg and Scheingold for also predicting this expected "sector integrated 
supranational system."49 Hughes suggests that complex interdependence is 
insightful because of the direction in which it leads toward "discrete issues, the 
extensiveness of inter-issue linkages, and to the considerable constraints placed 
on state action by a dense pattern of interactions."50 
This approach is similar in part, if not in whole, to the approach taken by 
Keohane and Hoffmann in delineating the concept of pooled sovereignty by 
supranational decision-making procedures in the European Community. 
Hughes, perhaps more explicitly, articulates the linkages between complex 
46 Hughes, "Delivering the Goods," 3. 
47
 Ibid., 3. 
48 Hopkins, Structure and Process in International Politics, 301. 
49 Lindberg, Europe's Would-Be Polity. 309. 
50 Keohane, Power and Interdependence referred to in "Delivering the Goods: European 
Integration and the Evolution of Complex Governance," Barry B. Hughes, 4. Paper 
prepared for the American Political Science Association Annual meeting, 
Washington, D.C. August 1991. 
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interdependence and integration theories, while at the same time identifying 
similar Community characteristics. The distinction between the conclusions 
reached by Keohane and Hoffmann, and Hughes lies only in the scope of their 
theorizing. Hughes's thesis categorizes the European Community "not as an 
embryo of a superstate or supemation, but as one organ in the embryo of 
complex governance."51 In other words, the EC is a supranational "part" of the 
"whole" that is complex governance. 
All of these potential classifications serve to illustrate the varied 
outcomes anticipated by integration theorists. In trying to determine whether 
the European Community is changing, one must have some sort of expectation 
of what the Community will or will not change into. This is why much of 
integration literature focuses on answering the question of what the European 
Community will become before answering the question of whether or not it is 
changing. 
51 Hughes, "Delivering the Goods," 4. 
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CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
The European Community 
In Chapter Two the foundational theories of integration were reviewed 
and applied to the European Community. The Community was held up to the 
various categories of international actors to obtain a sense of what expectations 
the theories of integration have for the Community. In this chapter a brief 
history of the evolution of the Community will be provided along with a 
description of its institutional structure. In the second section special attention 
will be paid to the Court of Justice to provide a solid background for the 
research that follows. 
The European Community consists of three organizations. The European 
Coal and Steel Community was the first organization, established in 1951. The 
European Atomic Energy Community (also known as Euratom) was initiated 
along with the European Economic Community in 1957. While these three 
Communities were created in separate treaties, they rely on the same institutions 
and consist of the same member states. Consequently, they are referred to 
collectively as the European Community.52 
European Community membership initially consisted of six countries: 
France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The 
European Coal and Steel Community was initiated by a plan drafted by 
Frenchman Jean Monnet and presented by then French Foreign Minister Robert 
52 The three communities were officially named the European Community in 1978 when the 
European Parliament passed a resolution to do so. Borchardt, Community Law. 5-6. 
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Schuman in May of 1950. In an effort to pool Europe’s coal and steel industries 
Schuman and Monnet proposed joint administration of these industries by 
national and supranational authorities. The ECSC meant different things to 
different people, but Schuman and Monnet saw it as only the first of many steps 
in a process ultimately leading to political integration.53 Schuman, Monnet and 
other like-minded Community advocates hoped to initiate a unification process 
that would link the economies of member states to such an extent that it would 
be virtually impossible for them to wage war on one another.54 The Schuman 
Plan claimed, 
The pooling of coal and steel production will immediately 
provide for the establishment of common bases for economic 
development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will 
change the destinies of those regions which have long been 
devoted to the munitions of war, of which they have been the 
most constant victims.55 
While the ECSC was not the first attempt at bringing Europe closer 
together through economic or political cooperation, it was the first major step in 
the unification process that has resulted in the European Community as it is 
today. 
The Treaty of Rome in 1957 signalled a major addition to the ECSC and 
another step along the road to European integration. The road to Rome had not 
been smooth, and several other previous attempts to further link Europe fell by 
53 Derek Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 
1945. (New York: Longman House, 1991), 43-44. 
54 Borchardt, Community Law. 6-10. 
55 Urwin, Community of Europe. 46. 
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the wayside.56 The Treaty of Rome consisted of two new communities, the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic 
Community (EEC). The Euratom Treaty sought to link the economies of the 
member states in the research and development of atomic energy in order to 
create the "conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of 
nuclear industries."^7 Similarly, the EEC Treaty aimed at broader economic 
policy coordination among members by establishing a common market in order 
to, 
...promote throughout the Community a harmonious 
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced 
expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the 
standard of living and closer relations between the States 
belonging to it. 5 8 
Combined with the ECSC Treaty, these two new treaties form the 
foundation of the European Community. They have been supplemented and 
amended by other treaties and acts, but for the most part they have remained the 
same. 
In terms of geographical expansion, the Community has experienced 
growth on a number of occasions. EC membership grew in 1973 to include 
Denmark, Ireland and Great Britain. This first enlargement could have occured 
56 This comment is in reference to the failed efforts at a European Defence Community and 
the Western Defence union in the 1950s. See further Urwin, The Community of 
Europe. 60-75. 
57 Article 1, "Euratom." Commission of the European Communites Treaties Establishing 
the European Communities: The ECSC. EEC. EAEC, the Single European Act and 
Other Basic Instuments (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1987): 393. 
58 Article 1, "EEC Treaty," Ibid., 125. 
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much earlier had it not been for French President, General de Gaulle who 
opposed British accession attempts in 1961 and 1967.59 The Community again 
grew in size when Greece joined in 1981, and when Spain and Portugal joined 
in 1986.60 This southward expansion brought with it new policy concerns and 
developments. For example, the entry of these less industrialized and more 
agrarian members has resulted, inter alia, in a reevaluation and restructuring of 
the Community Agricultural Policy (CAP). Shifts in emphasis and policy 
directives of this kind evidence some of the effect of this southward 
expansion .61 Further Community enlargements seem probable given recent 
events in Central and Eastern Europe, and given the current negotiations over 
the accession of Austria, Switzerland and Finland. It seems reasonable to 
expect that any new accessions will also effect the functioning and policy goals 
of the EC. 
Along with changes initiated by these geographical expansions have 
come policy changes in the Community. The European Economic Community 
has been "revitalized" by the project directed at rempving all internal market 
barriers by the end of 1992.62 in order to expedite this process, the 1992 
program was incorporated into the Treaties of Rome in the Single European Act 
in 1987, which directed the Community to take all necessary steps to complete 
59 Unfortunately for the Danes and the Irish, their applications for membership were 
attached to the British application, as was the practice then. Neill Nugent, The 
Government and Politics of the European Community, second edition, (Durham, 
North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1991), 50. 
60 Borchardt, Community Law. 6-7. 
61 Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Community. 53. 
67 Keohane, The New European Community. 7. 
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the internal market by the 1992 deadline.63 The Single European Act amends 
the EEC Treaty by adding, inter alia, the following provision: 
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of 
progressively establishing the internal market over a period 
expiring on 31 December 1992, in accordance with the provisions 
of the Article and of Articles 8b, 8c, 28, 57 (2), 59, 70 (1), 84, 99, 
100a and 100b and without prejudice to the other provisions of this 
Treaty. 
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty.64 
This revitalization through closer economic union has rippled throughout the 
Community and has served as a booster for other EC projects. 
The EC consists of five main institutions; the Commission, the Council of 
Ministers, the Parliament, the European Council, and the Court of Justice. 
Since 1967 these institutions have been shared by all three of the Communities. 
Each institution has a different role in the decision-making process and the 
general functioning of the Community. 
The Commission is appointed for four-year terms by the governments of 
the member states, and its function is mainly that of initiating all Community 
actions. The Commission may also challenge the actions of individual member 
states if they contradict Community law. It can pass legislation, but only 
subject to Council approval.65 In many ways the Commission can be 
63 Borchardt, Community Law. 8. 
64 The "Single European Act,” in Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 544. 
65 Allan M. Williams, The European Community: The Contradictions of Integration 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, Ltd, 1991), 11. 
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considered an executive branch in that it oversees the Community bureaucracy 
and is responsible for the implementation of Community directives within the 
EC. The Commission is also responsible for defending Community interests in 
debates before the Council.66 The Commission is held accountable to the 
Parliament and must present a report of its activities annually to the Parliament. 
If the Parliament does not approve of the Commission's conduct, it can call for 
the resignation of the entire Commission through a vote of no confidence.67 
The Commission’s role in the legislative process is mostly technical and 
administrative much like the bureaucracy in the United States. Legislation by 
the Commission is usually more technical in nature, along the lines of 
administrative law, and is "subject to tight guidlines laid down in enabling 
Council legislation."^ In terms of size, however, Commission legislation is 
approximately two times as voluminous as Council legislation.69 
The Council is a board of representatives of all the governments of the 
member states and serves as a forum for airing the interests of the member 
states. Its purpose, however, is as an institution of the Community, rather than 
as an "intergovernmental conference."70 The Council is the primary legislative 
body for Euratom and the EEC, but its role in the European Coal and Steel 
66 Ibid., 15, 19-20. The Commission has both 'primary' and 'derived' executive powers 
through the administration of Community law. For more see Borchardt, Community 
Law. 19-20. 
67 Borchardt. Community Law. 15. 
68 Nugent. The Government and Politics of the European Community. 168. 
69 Ibid., 168. 
70 Borchardt. Community Law. 18. 
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Community (ECSC) is mainly as an endorsing body. Originally, member states 
had a right of veto in the Council, but the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 
stressed a more consensual approach of qualified majority voting, except in 
sensitive areas such as "taxation, the free movement of labour and the rights and 
interests of workers."71 The SEA supplements the EEC treaty, for example, 
with the following provisions: 
1. By way of derogation from Article 100 and save where 
otherwise provided in this Treaty, the following provisions shall 
apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 8a. 
The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission in cooperation with the European Parliament 
and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt 
the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which 
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those 
relating to the free movement of persons nor to those relating to the 
rights and interests of employed persons.72 
There are four different types of Community legislation distinguished in 
the founding treaties: regulations, directives, decisions, and 
recommendations73 Regulations (called general decisions under the ECSC) 
are usually adopted by the Commission and are adminsitrative and technical 
adjustments to existing Community law. Most Community regulations relate to 
71 Ibid., 18-19. 
72 The "Single European Act," in Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 547. 
73 These types of legislation are delineated in Article 14 of the ECSC Treaty, Article 189 of 
the EEC Treaty, and Article 161 of the Euratom Treaty. Nugent, The Government 
and Politics of the European Community. 168. 
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the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 74 Directives (called 
recommendations under the ECSC) are "binding as to the result to be achieved, 
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and method."75 Because directives are not 
necessarily applicable to all member states, (only to those to which they are 
addressed), and because directives require action by the member states to have 
direct effect, they are usually more general in nature than regulations, and 
consist of policy principles for member states to pursue in ways they deem most 
appropriate.76 Community decisions (individual decisions under the ECSC) 
are also binding in their entirety, but only on those to whom they are addressed. 
Decisions are different from directives in that they can be addressed to member 
states, or individuals. Most decisions are highly specific and administrative in 
nature, but some others more closely resemble directives in their decree of 
general principles.77 Recommendations (opinions under the ECSC) are unique 
in that they have no binding force on member states or individuals. Along with 
other Community proposals, agreements, guidelines, etc., recommendations are 
just that. The Court of Justice, however, has on occassion referred to 
74 ibid., 169. 
75 Article 189, "EEC Treaty," in Treaties Establishing the European Communities, 282. 
76 in practice, most directives are addressed to all member states, and are commonly drafted 
in such a way that there is little room for variation in the implementation methods for 
national authorities. It has also been the case that The Court of Justice has ruled that 
some directives are directly applicable, for example when national authorities have 
unduly delayed implementation or have incorrectly implemented the directive in such 
a way as to distort its purpose. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European 
Community. 169-171. 
77 Ibid., 171. 
30 
recommendations in its decisions, imparting some legal status to them. 
Therefore the legal status of recommendations is sometimes unclear.78 These 
four types of Community acts comprise the legislative methods available to the 
Council and the Commission for creating Community law. 
The Parliament is directly elected by the citizens of the member states, 
but it "exercises only symbolically the functions of a true parliament." 
Originating with the ECSC, the Parliament was referred to as the Assembly. 
The Parliament is generally considered the weakest of the four main 
Community institutions but that reputation has been gradually improving. In 
the legislative process, the Parliament plays mostly an advisory role, 
participating in policy debates with the Commission before a proposal is made 
to the Council. The Parliament can also formally submit proposals for new 
Community legislation to the Commission but the Commission is under no 
obligation to take on the proposals.79 The Parliament does have more power in 
the Community budgetary process. A Joint Declaration in 1982 between the 
Council, the Commission, and the Parliament aimed at improving the budgetary 
process, opened the door for increased Parliamentary involvement.80 For 
example, the institutions agreed that spending caps for legislation should be 
treated as part of the budgetary process instead of the legislative process.81 
The Parliament was further strengthened by the SEA in 1987 but still its only 
real decision-making power remains in decisions "concerning the accession of 
78
 Ibid., 171-2. 
"79 Nugent. The Government and Politics of the European Community. 129-130. 
80 Ibid., 130. 
81
 Ibid., 130. 
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new Member States and association with non-member states."82 in most other 
areas of Community legislative and budgetary processes the Parliament's role is 
limited relative to those of the Commission and the Council. In this regard, the 
European Parliament is very different from the parliaments of national 
governments throughout Europe. 
The European Council was institutionalized in 1974 at the Paris Summit, 
although it did exist in the form of a few summit meetings of Heads of 
Government in the 1960s and 1970s. The European Council was established to 
bring together informally on a regular basis (twice yearly) the Heads of 
Government of the member states to "exchange ideas, to give direction to policy 
development, and perhaps sometimes to break deadlocks and clear logjams."83 
The European Council was expected to deal mainly with general policy issues 
instead of details, though in practice it has dealt with both. The European 
Council has been active in many issue areas including economic and social 
conditions within the Community, international economic and monetary issues, 
economic and monetary integration, international political issues, specific 
Community policy issues, and constitutional and institutional matters within the 
Community.84 The role of the European Council in Community affairs has 
become perhaps, more involved than originally intended. As one author 
explains: "The evolution and operation of the European Council have owed 
much more to the preferences of the participants and practical necessities than 
82 Borchardt. Community Law. 15-17. 
83 Nugent. The Government and Politics of the European Community. 193. 
84 This listing was suggested by S. Bulmer and W. Wessels in The European Council. 
(Macmillan Press, 1987) referenced in Nugent, The Government and Politics of the 
European Community. 201-206. 
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they have to agreed rules and requirements."85 The European Council's role in 
EC politics has been to provide a larger voice to the member states and to 
increase the intergovernmental aspect of the Community, "by virtue of the fact 
that the leaders usually act on the basis of unanimous agreements — either 
because they prefer to or, where subsequent Council legislation is required to 
give their decisions effect, because they may in effect be required to."86 
The Court of Justice 
The purpose of the EC Court of Justice is to see that the treaties and laws 
of the Community are adhered to by Community institutions, member states, 
and citizens of the Community. The Court plays a unique role as the supreme 
body in determining questions of community law.87 While there is no 
supremacy clause in the Treaties of Rome, the Court ruled in the 1964 case 
Costa v. Enel that Community law takes precedence above all national law 
when the two conflict.88 Flaminio Costa was an Italian who refused to pay his 
electric bill (of approximately $3.00) on the basis that Italy's nationalization of 
85
 Ibid., 194. 
86 Ibid., 206. 
87 Ibid., 32. 
88 G. Frederico Mancini, "The Making of a Constitution for Europe," in The New European 
Community: Decision-making and Institutional Change, ed. Robert O. Keohane and 
Stanley Hoffmann (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 181. 
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electric companies violated Article 37 of the EEC Treaty.89 The Court 
explained: 
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its 
own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and 
capacity of representation on the international plane and, more 
particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty 
or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the 
Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds 
both their nationals and themselves. 
The integration into the laws of each Member State of 
provisions which derive from the Community, and more generally 
the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, make it impossible for the 
States, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and 
subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a 
basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot therefore be 
inconsistent with that legal system. The executive force of 
Community law cannot vary from one State to another in deference 
to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment 
of the objectives of the Treaty...The obligations undertaken under 
the Treaty establishing the Community would not be 
unconditional, but merely contingent, if they could be called in 
question by subsequent legislative acts of the signatories...The 
transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the 
Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under 
the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign 
rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with 
the concept of the Community cannot prevail.90 
89 Article 37 directs member states to adjust any state monopolies of a "commercial 
character" to remove any discrimination regarding conditions under which goods and 
services are procured and marketed between nationals of member states. Article 37, 
"EEC Treaty," in Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 150. Costa v 
ENEL in Mary L. Volcansek, "The European Court of Justice: Supranational Policy- 
Making," West European Politics , Special Issue on Judicial Politics and Policy- 
Making in Western Europe 15 (July 1992): 112. 
90 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL (1964) European Court Reports. 585; in Joseph Weiler, 
"Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the Law Relevant?," 
Journal of Common Market Studies xxi (September/December 1982): 44. 
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Equally as critical to the development of Community law was the 
establishment of the direct effect doctrine. The Van Gend en Loos case was the 
first case in which the Court articulated direct effect. In Van Gend en Loos the 
Court ruled that "under certain conditions provisions of the Treaty [EEC] itself 
would have direct effect in the Community bestowing enforceable rights as 
between individuals and the Member States."91 The Court continued, 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community 
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit 
of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit 
within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not 
Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the 
legislation of Member States.[sicl Community law therefore 
not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended 
to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal 
heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly 
granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which 
the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as 
well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the 
Community.92 
The direct effect doctrine has been further solidified in other similar cases since 
Van Gend en Loos in 1963. For example, in the case Simmenthal v Commission 
in 1978 the Court wrote, 
Every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, 
apply Community law in its entirely and protect rights which 
the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside 
91 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, in Joseph Weiler, "Community, Member 
States and European Integration: Is the Law Relevant?," 42. 
92
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any provision of national law which may conflict with it, 
whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule.93 
The Simmenthal case is considered an example of the Court's application of 
both the direct effect and the supremacy doctrines to ensure member states are 
fulfilling their Community obligations.94 These two legal doctrines serve as 
foundations of Community case law, and have been relied upon heavily since 
their first applications. In fact they are commonly referred to as the "twin 
pillars of the Community legal system" and as such are critical to a full 
understanding of the Community's legal authority.95 
In addition to hearing actual cases, the Court of Justice also issues 
advisory opinions in the form of preliminary rulings. These preliminary rulings 
are allowed under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, which reads, 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; 
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the 
institutions of the Community; 
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established 
by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide. 
Where such a question is raised before any court or 
tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it 
considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable 
93 Simmenthal v Commission, 106/77, 1978, ECR 629 at 651-652, in Nugent, The 
Government and Politics of the European Community. 178. 
94 Janet L. Kent, "Effectiveness of the European Court of Justice and Its Role in the Process 
of Integration," Paper prepared for the European Community Studies Association 
Second International Conference at George Mason Unviersity, Fairfax, Virginia, Mav 
22-24, 1991. 
95 Jean-Victor Louis, The Community Legal Order (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 1990): 8. 
36 
it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling 
thereon. 
Where any such question is raised in a case pending 
before a court or tribunal of a Member State, against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that 
court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice.96 
This outlet for national courts directly linking them to the Court of Justice 
essentially provides another tier of Community courts by placing national courts 
in the Community structure. Community law is further strengthened by this 
linkage because in issuing a preliminary ruling, the Court of Justice rules only 
on the interpretation of the law. It does not issue a decision on the specific facts 
of the case before it.97 The application of the law (as interpreted by the Court 
of Justice) is left to the national courts, so the actual decision on the case at 
hand is handed down by the national court, therefore giving it the full authority 
and legitimacy of any other national court decision. One scholar of the Court 
writes, "The main result of this procedure is the binding effect and enforcement 
value which such a decision will have on a Member State—coming from its own 
courts—as opposed to a similar decision handed from Luxembourg by the 
European Court of Justice wearing its intergovernmental hat."98 
The Court does not require that an actual dispute exist for a preliminary 
ruling to be issued. A preliminary ruling can be, and often is, issued for 
96 Article 177 of the "EEC Treaty," Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 279. 
97 This distinction is interesting. In American courts the judge is considered the interpreter 
of law, and the jury the interpreter of fact. This is the same distinction at work in the 
Community except that in this case, the national level courts serve to interpret the 
facts after the Court of Justice provides an interpretation of the law. 
98 Weiler, "Is the Law Relevant?," 55. 
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preemptive measure. This is in part due to one of the functions and purposes of 
preliminary rulings, which is to "bring to an end such violations in order to 
ensure the achievement of the objectives of the Community."99 Preliminary 
rulings also serve to ensure legally "correct" judgments by national courts and 
they provide an access route to the Court for individuals who "cannot directly 
appeal to it, either because there is no legal provision or because of inadequacy 
of funds." 
This ability to issue preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation 
of Community law and the Court's ability to hear actual cases combined with 
the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect make the Court an important and 
potentially powerful Community institution. With the accession of Spain and 
Portugal the Court was expanded from eleven judges to thirteen; one from each 
member state and another from one of the four largest member states, 
(Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy). 101 Judges are appointed for six 
year terms (staggered every three years to allow for continuity), which can be 
and often are renewed. Although the Treaties state that judges are to be 
appointed "by common accord of the Governments of the Member States," from 
among persons "whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the 
qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their 
respective countries or who are juriconsults of recognised competence," this is 
99 Christine Gray, "Advisory Opinions and the European Court of Justice," European Law 
Review, n.s. 8 (1983):38. 
100 Nugent. The Government and Politics of the European Community. 187. 
101 Mary L. Volcansek, "The European Court of Justice:Supranational Policy-Making," 
West European Politics: Special Issue on Judicial Politics and Policy-Making in 
Western Europe 15 (July 1992): 111.12 
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not necessarily the case. 102 jn practice, each state is allowed one nominee 
automatically, leaving only the thirteenth judge to be chosen by 'common 
accord.' While there appears to be no evidence of political appointments, 
judges are generally chosen based on a "background in professional activities 
and public service. "103 Once chosen, the judges elect a President of the Court 
among themselves for a three year term who is then responsible for overseeing 
the administration of the Court's activities. Duties include scheduling cases, 
and assigning cases to the Court's Chambers. The Court of Justice does much 
of its work in Chambers. There are two Chambers with five judges and four 
Chambers with three judges, along with the full Court. The importance of a 
case determines whether it will be assigned to either one of the Chambers or to 
the full Court. Generally, if a case is relatively straight forward and raises no 
substantial points of principle, or the circumstance falls under existing 
Community law, the case will be referred to a Chamber of three judges. More 
complex cases or cases dealing with novel or important points of law are 
referred to either a Chamber of five or to the full Court, again depending on the 
relative importance of the case. 104 The full Court reaches a quorum with seven 
judges present. 
The Court is assisted by six Advocates-General, who serve as researchers 
and lawyers, but not in the sense that lawyers function in the United States. An 
Advocate-General is assigned to each case to research the facts and the law 
102 Article 32b as amended by Article 4 (2) (a) of the Convention on Common Institutions, 
"ECSC Treaty," in Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 45. 
103 Nugent.-The Government and Politics of the European Communities. 187-188. 
104
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relevant to the case. After collecting all information and opinions relevant to 
the case, the Advocate-General presents the case to the Court or Chamber, 
providing the facts, the opinions of concerned parties, and then a 
recommendation for action by the Court or Chamber. The Court or Chamber is 
not required to accept the Advocate-General's recommendation, but uses it as a 
basis for their deliberations. All Court (and Chamber) deliberations are 
conducted in secrecy, and all decisions and preliminary rulings are delivered as 
unanimous (though majority voting is used). No dissents are ever issued and all 
deliberations are secretive in order to allow judges to be impartial and to avoid 
pressure from their nominating governments and other constituents. 105 
Since the Court's inception with the ECSC, it has continued to grow in 
importance and case load. 106 As a result of the growing case load of the Court, 
in 1988 a Court of First Instance was established under the provisions of the 
Single European Act. The Court of First Instance is responsible for personnel 
actions against the Community, for certain actions under competition law and 
anti-dumping law, and for actions under the ECSC Treaty. 107 While this new 
court has original jurisdiction in these areas, all cases heard by the Court of 
First Instance are subject to appeal to the Court of Justice. This appeal process 
links the two courts and allows the Court of Justice to maintain its status as the 
court of last resort, while still reducing its case load. The Court of First 
105
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107
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Instance began hearing cases in November of 1989, and by the end of 1992 had 
decided approximately 207 cases. 108 
In overseeing Community law, the Court of Justice, (and now the Court 
of First Instance as a lower Community court) plays a leading role in the 
development and integration of the Community. The supremacy of European 
Community law over conflicting national laws as established in the supremacy 
and direct effect doctrines, further strengthens the leadership role of the Court. 
Borchardt suggests that the Court is credited with "having defined the principles 
on which the Community legal order rests, thereby providing the process of 
European integration with a firm foundation." 109 This study intends to see if 
this is indeed the case. 
This chapter has provided a brief history of the development of the 
European Community. It has described the four main institutions of the 
Comunity and some of their policy-making processes. The mission of the Court 
has been discussed as well as the two key doctrines developed by the Court to 
strengthen Community law, supremacy and direct effect. In Chapter Four the 
methodology that will be used to anlayze the Court’s integration will be 
detailed. It will provide a review of the data source and an operationalized 
definition of integration. 
108 The Commission of the European Community, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. (1989-1992): 436, 448, 454, and 508 respectively. 
109 Borchardt, Community Law. 21. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter lays out the methodology used to analyze the Court's 
integration. It will examine the information in the data source and highlight the 
specific data to be used in this study. The definition of integration will be 
operationalized and an examination of the indicators for scope and domain 
provided. After a review of the paths of integration articulated by Philippe 
Schmitter (detailed in Chapter Two), the paths of integration will be combined 
with the potential results of our indicators to illustrate possible paths for the 
Court. This version of the Court's potential paths of integration will serve to 
place the results in the context of previous integration theories. This chapter 
will lay the methodological groundwork for the data analysis and findings in 
Chapter Five. This in turn will suggest conclusions about the research and its 
implications for the Court, the European Community and international relations 
in Chapter Six. Before the data source is examined, though, it is necessary to 
reiterate the importance of research on the Court of Justice and its role in EC 
integration. 
Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann declare: "Increasingly in 
years to come, international politics will be played on the chessboard of 
economic interdependence, where Community authority is predominant..." 110 
In addition, European Community decision-making has "quite suddenly become 
more decisive, expeditious, and effective." 111 Economic concerns are no 
HO Keohane, "Conclusions," 292. 
HI Ibid., 284. 
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longer considered low politics, but rather have joined rank with military 
concerns as critical international security issues. 
Given the increased importance of economic concerns, issues of 
integration, specifically economic integration, are also growing in importance. 
Existing regional and international organizations created to address specific 
issue-areas continue to provide both answers and new questions in the 
international arena. The need for these organizations is ever-present as nation¬ 
states become less able to meet the transnational needs of their citizens. 112 The 
need for supranational organizations to address transnational issues such as 
price stability, environmental protection, and capital flows became apparent as 
individual nation-states were unable to regulate or stop these issues at their 
borders. While the acceptance of the nation-state as the predominant unit of 
analysis is not in question here, the role of potentially supranational 
organizations like the European Community is in question because of their 
potential for altering or modifying nation-state behavior. 
Little research has been done to assess the role of the Court in 
Community integration.! 13 Nevertheless, within the European Community, the 
Court of Justice is a crucial component in the integration process. The Court's 
unique position and ability to rule definitively on the legal aspects of integration 
Hopkins, Structure and Process in International Politics. 279. 
H3 Most of the work done regarding the role of the Court has focused on the theoretical 
underpinnings and methodological approaches that could be used in an assessment of 
the Court. Very little research has been done to actually assess the role of the Court. 
See further Joseph Weiler, "Community, Member States and European Integration: Is 
the Law Relevant?" in the Journal of Common Market Studies; Special Issue on the 
European Community: Past. Present and Future, vol. xxi, no. 1 &2. 
September/December 1982. Also see Mary Volcansek, "The European Court of 
Justice: Supranational Policy-Making," in West European Politics: Special Issue on 
Judicial Politics and Policy-Making in Western Europe, vol. 15, no.3. July 1992. 
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provide it the opportunity to clear new paths for integration. As William 
Wallace declares: "The accretion of legal norms has proven to be an essential 
vehicle for consolidating the Community enterprise." 114 He continues to 
explain that legal norms serve to codify accepted behavior by Community 
members and therefore play a dual role in the integration process both as an 
integrating factor and as a reflection of integration initiated in other community 
institutions. Consequently, the Community’s Court of Justice is an appropriate 
indicator of Community integration. This is best expressed by Renaud 
Dehousse and Joseph H.H. Weiler in an article discussing the legal dimension 
of the Community. They write, "legal and institutional elements condition both 
the magnitude and the spatial scope of integration."! 15 They continue to 
explain that legal institutions can develop a dynamic of their own when 
entrusted with specific competences as the ECJ is. By giving the EC total 
competence in specific areas such as competition and international trade, 
member states are deprived of acting autonomously in these areas. In this way, 
EC institutions and the Court specifically have a significant degree of control 
over the extent to which integration in these fields of competence occurs. 
Furthermore, the Court has taken on an activist role in the integration of the 
European Community by crafting such legal doctrines as direct effect and 
Community law supremacy.! 16 Indeed the Court has interpreted its role as one 
H4 Wallace. Policy-Making in the European Community. 412. 
H5 Dehousse, "The Legal Dimension," 242. 
H6 Ibid., 242-255. For more on the doctrines of direct effect and Community law 
supremacy see Chapter 3 here. 
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necessitating the filling in of lacunea "caused by the inaction of Community 
legislative organs." 117 
It is worth noting here, that the relationship between the Court and other 
EC institutions is not necessarily one of single-minded harmony. Because the 
institutions of the Community are charged with different purposes, friction 
among them can result when each institution pursues its own purpose. The 
Court's mission is to see to the adherence of the treaties and laws of the 
Community by Community institutions, member states and citizens. This 
coupled with its ability to interpret the treaties and laws, enables it to play a 
much larger role in the Community's integration process than may have been 
intended originally. This is in part, why study of the Court and its reflection of 
the integration process is worthwhile. 
Data Sources 
Considering the potentially influential role of the Court, very little data 
on the activities of the Court exist. The data source utilized in this study are the 
reports of the Activities of the Court of Justice in the General Report on the 
Activities of the European Communities written by the European 
Commission.! 18 The Report is published annually by the European 
Commission in Brussels and is part of the Commission's report to the European 
Parliament. The data in the Reports begin in 1978 and continue through 1992, 
117 Ibid., 246. 
European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Communities. 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1978- 
1992). 
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which provides fifteen years of Court activity data. This report covers the years 
shortly after Danish, Irish and British entry into the EC (1973), and the 
accession of Greece (1981), Spain, and Portugal (1986).! 19 We will need to 
account for any increase in Court activity from this geographical expansion of 
the EC resulting from the accession of these new member states during this 
fifteen year period. The data also include six years of the most recent data on 
the EC with the current membership of twelve member states. 
Each annual report contains a classification of ECJ cases. The reports 
break down the Court's case load into categories of subject matter (see Table 
4.1). The first classification separates cases by the treaty under which each case 
was brought, either the ECSC, Euratom, or EEC Treaty. Within each of these 
treaty classifications, the case is further categorized by the main issue area 
involved in each case. Cases are classified according to the legal basis used by 
the ECJ in its decision. 120 Cases based on more than one Treaty article are 
cross-listed under all relevant articles used in the Court's decision. 121 The data 
provided includes actions brought, cases not resulting in judgments, and cases 
decided. 
H9 Borchardt, Community Law. 6-7. 
170 Christopher Ross, academic consultant for the Commission of the European 
Communities, telephone interview by author, 25 March 1993, Washington, DC. 
171 Asa result of this potoential for multiple listings, the cases in each issue area may not 
add up to equal the total number of cases. 
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The annual report also provides an analysis of ECJ cases by the treaty 
article under which the case proceedings were brought. This information is 
provided in the form illustrated in Table 4.2. All preliminary rulings issued by 
the Court are also brought under a specific article of one of the founding treaties 
(EEC, ECSC, or Euratom). The EEC Treaty provides for preliminary rulings 
under Article 177 (see excerpt in Chapter Three above), the ECSC Treaty 
allows for preliminary rulings under Article 150, and the Euratom Treaty does 
so under Article 41.122 The data for the ECSC and Euratom Treaties are 
provided in the reports as illustrated in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, depending on the 
total number of cases brought to the Court in each particular year. 
The annual reports also sort ECJ cases by plaintiff. This analysis 
classifies the plaintiffs as either governments, individuals, or Community 
institutions. 123 Table 4.3 illustrates classifications of only the ECSC and 
Euratom Treaties, classifying cases both by the treaty article the case was 
brought under and by plaintiff type, again either governments, individuals or 
Community institutions. 
Also, beginning in 1991 the annual report began to provide data on the 
activities of the Court of First Instance, illustrated in Table 4.4. As mentioned 
above, the Court of First Instance was created in 1987 as part of the Single 
122 "ECSC Treaty," 51, "Euratom Treaty," in Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities. 472. 
123 It is interesting to note that in 1983 the classification heading of "by individuals 
(undertakings)" was changed to "by natural or legal persons" for the ECSC and 
Euratom data. No explanation was provided for the change. One can only assume 
that the new heading was more accurate in some way. The Commission of the 
European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the European 
Comunities. 1983, 350. 
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Table 4.4. 1991 Court of First Instance cases analyzed by issue 
area 
Type 
of case 
ECSC EEC 
(competition) 
Staff cases Total 
Actions brought 1 11 80 92 
Cases not 
resulting in 
a judgment 1 1 13 15 
Cases decided 1 15 36 52 
European Act to reduce the case load of the Court of Justice. Prior to 1990 and 
after the inception of the Court of First Instance, these cases were included in 
the reports by footnote reference. 124 The Court of First Instance has 
jurisdiction as the trial court for all Community cases falling under the ECSC 
Treaty, all Community staff cases and certain competition cases under the EEC 
Treaty. 125 While this reflects a loss of direct, immediate involvement by the 
Court of Justice in these areas of competence, The maintainence of the Court of 
Justice as the appeals court still makes the Court of Justice the court of last 
resort. Unfortunately, the Court of First Instance is still so new, that little 
analysis of its role in the Community and its impact on the Court of Justice has 
been done. 
124 por more on the Court of First Instance see Chapter Three. 
125 Nugent. The Government and Politics of the European Community. 189. 
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An Operational Definition of Integration 
The key hypothesis is: The European Community is becoming more 
integrated. The integration of the Court of Justice of the European Community 
serves as a metaphor for integration in the European Community. 
Operationally, integration is defined as a function of the Court’s scope, meaning 
the breadth of issue area coverage, and domain, meaning the degree of authority 
held by the Court. Since integration is defined as a process here, any measures 
of integration are measures of increases or decreases in the Court's progress 
along the path of integration relative to previous levels of integration. By 
analyzing cases in the Court's scope and domain, an indication of the Court's, 
and by extension the Community's, integration can be determined. 
If the combined analysis of the component parts of integration show that 
both the Court's scope and domain are increasing over time, we can conclude 
that the Court is indeed becoming more integrated. This would be considered 
"spillover" according to neofunctionalist theory, and as illustrated by Schmitter 
(see the potential paths of integration in Figure 4.1) where spillover is the 
expansion of the issue areas in which the Court has competence and an increase 
in decisional authority. 126 if this is the case, we can conclude that the 
European Community is becoming more integrated. Conversely, if analysis of 
the data indicate that both the scope and domain of the Court are shrinking, we 
126 Schmitter, "Regional Integration," 845. 
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Figure 4.1. Potential paths of integration 
infer that the Court is becoming less integrated. This is "spill back," and entails 
a retreat on both dimensions, according to Schmitter.127 if analysis of the data 
indicate that the Court's domain is increasing over time, but its scope is 
decreasing, we infer that while the Court's horizontal coverage of Community 
issues is limited, its degree of authority within those issue areas is increasing. 
This is labeled by Schmitter as "retrenchment," and it involves an "increase [in] 
the level of joint deliberation but withdrawal of the institutions from certain 
areas." 128 if the exact opposite appears to be true from analysis of the data, we 
127 ibid., 846. 
128
 Ibid., 846. 
53 
infer that even though the Court is expanding into new issue areas, its authority 
in all issue areas is declining. 
"Muddling about" is the label Schmitter uses to identify this integration 
path, which he describes as letting "the regional bureaucrats debate, suggest, 
and expostulate on a wider variety of issues but decrease their actual capacity to 
allocate values."129 "Build up" is the term applied when the scope of the Court 
is not changing but the domain of the Court is increasing. 130 The last potential 
path surveyed by Schmitter is "spill around" which describes an increasing 
scope for the Court, but an unchanging domain. 131 This would apply to a 
Court that is addressing more issue areas, but is only maintaining current levels 
of authority within those areas. 
These combinations describe the possible paths of integration for the 
Court. By measuring the change in scope and domain of authority of the Court, 
we can determine the direction of Court integration. If the Court is gaining or 
losing jurisdictional ground in some issue areas or is increasing or decreasing its 
level of authority within the issue areas in its competence, we can generalize 
that the Community is doing similarly though with the qualification attached 
that it may be that the loss of decisional authority in the Court is due to an 
increase in authority by another Community institution. Still, the Court would 
remain the ultimate arbiter in any question of Community law. In order to 
assess the direction of the Court’s integration, it is necessary to operationalize 
129
 Ibid., 846. 
130
 Ibid., 846. 
131 Ibid., 845. 
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the two component parts of integration, scope and domain, and to discuss the 
indicators that will be used to measure each. 
The scope of the Court refers to the issue areas within the Court's 
jurisdiction. Scope is a measure of the breadth of Court involvement in 
European Community affairs and the lives of its member states and citizens. 
Schmitter defines it as " the issue areas in which these [regional] institutions are 
permitted or not permitted to deal." 132 The first indicator of scope is the 
number of issue areas addressed by the Court of Justice each year. Issue areas 
refer to the type of question being adjudicated in each case and are determined 
by the Court of Justice in its decision. The European Commission in the 
General Report on the Activities of the European Communities, classifies ECJ 
cases by subject matter according to the legal basis of the Court in making its 
decision. 133 it is worth noting that the categories used by the Commission in 
its classification of cases are general in nature, relative to the detailed and 
highly complex nature of Community law. Cases are broadly categorized as 
"competition," "commercial policy," and "agricultural policy" for example. 
The indicator of number of issue areas addressed by the Court will 
provide an indication of the Court’s scope. Since the Court's scope is by 
definition, the number of legal areas within which the Court has competence, 
measuring change in the number of issue areas addressed by the Court will 
serve as a measure of the Court's scope. If the Court is addressing more areas 
over time, we infer that its scope is increasing. If the Court is addressing 
!32 Ibid., 844. 
133 Christopher Ross, academic consultant for the Commission of the European 
Communities, telephone interview by author, 25 March 1993, Washington, DC. 
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approximately the same number of issue areas over time, we infer that its scope 
is neither increasing nor decreasing. If the Court is addressing fewer issue areas 
over time, we infer that its scope is decreasing. This indicator serves as an 
initial measure of scope, and its results will be combined with the results of a 
second indicator to provide a fuller measure of change in the Court’s scope over 
time. This indicator, though, may not account for the loss of some issue areas 
to other Community institutions. Because the Court has taken an activist role in 
Community issues in the past, if the other institutions of the Community begin 
to act within a certain issue area, the Court may withdraw from that area, either 
temporarily or permanently. For example, if the Council legislates stricter 
policies on environmental protection measures, the Court may lose some of its 
necessity to act on questions of environmental policy. This would be a decline 
in the need for Court involvement, but only as a result of increased integration 
by other Community institutions. Therefore, the measure of scope based on the 
indicator of issue areas addressed by the Court must be evaluated with this 
qualification in mind. 
The second indicator is the type of plaintiffs, either governments, 
individuals, or Community institutions, bringing cases to the Court of Justice. 
This indicator is meant to provide another measure of the Court's, and by 
extension the Community’s, change in scope over time. Non-government 
plaintiffs are plaintiffs that are, by definition, not governments. This includes 
Community institutions and citizens (individuals) of member states. The 
European Commission includes natural and legal persons in the "individual" 
classification. The type of plaintiff bringing cases to the Court may reflect 
which actors within the Community consider the Court legitimate and therefore 
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useful. Though it may be the case that the Court is useful as only a symbolic 
tool on the part of plaintiffs, for the most part, it is assumed that if plaintiffs 
bring cases to the Court, they expect to benefit in some way from doing so. If 
the Court is perceived as useful by an increasing number of non-government 
plaintiffs we infer that it has established a role as a valid adjudicator in the 
minds of these non-government actors. The extent to which non-state actors 
utilize the Court reflects the degree to which the European Court is replacing 
national level courts as the court of choice in Community law issues. This 
suggests the extent to which the Court is directly affecting the lives of 
Community citizens. This indicator counts the number of cases brought to the 
Court each year (as opposed to cases decided), to account for all attempts to 
involve the ECJ in issues within the Community. If more non-government 
plaintiffs are bringing cases to the ECJ over time, we infer that its scope is 
increasing. If approximately the same number of non-government plaintiffs are 
bringing cases to the ECJ over time, we infer that the Court’s scope is neither 
increasing nor decreasing according to this measure. If fewer non-government 
plaintiffs are bringing cases to the Court over time, we infer that the Court's 
scope is decreasing according to this measure. 
The number of issue areas in which the Court has competence combined 
with the number of non-government plaintiffs bringing cases to the Court 
provide a measure of the Court’s scope. Table 4.5 contains the possible 
outcomes from these combined indicators of scope. Any of the possible 
combinations of results from the indicators of scope below will directly affect 
conclusions about the Court's integration progress. The other half of the 
definition of integration involves the Court's domain or vertical involvement in 
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the Community. Domain is a measure of the degree of the Court's authority 
within each issue area. Schmitter defines it as "the degree of decisional 
authority conceded to, devolved upon, or taken away from regional 
institutions."134 
The first indicator of domain is the average number of cases heard by the 
ECJ per member state per year. This indicator is meant to measure the Court's 
authority. Whether the Court is hearing more or fewer cases, will indicate if the 
domain of the Court's authority is increasing, unchanging, or decreasing. In 
order to account for the geographical expansions of the EC, though, we need to 
account for the number of member states in the Community each year. This 
will take into account any increase in Court cases due simply to an increase in 
Community member states. 135 Furthermore, because it takes approximately 
two years for a case to be processed through the Court, a two year time lag will 
be added to the accession dates of new member states. This will prevent 
counting a new member state before it has actually received a decision on a case 
it brought to the Court. This indicator specifically measures the number of 
cases heard by the Court in order to account only for cases in which the Court 
does have direct involvement and authority. If the average number of cases 
heard by the ECJ per member state per year (with the two year time lag) is 
134 Schmitter, "Regional Integration," 844. 
135 Although this may appear to be too imprecise a measure for the increase in the Court's 
constituency, because the data begin in 1978, the only accessions to the Community 
in this period were Spain, Portugal and Greece, none of which constituted major 
additions to the Court's constituency in terms of numbers of legal or natural 
individuals, relative to the Community's prior constituency. 
58 
Table 4.5. Potential scope of the Court. 
Variable Change Outcome 
If number of issue areas increases 
and number of non-government plaintiffs increases scope increases 
If number of issue areas increases, 
and number of non-government plaintiffs is unchanged scope increases 
If number of issue areas increases, 
and number of non-government plaintifffs decreases scope is unclear 
If number of issue areas is unchanged, 
and number of non-government plaintiffs increases scope increases 
If number of issue areas is unchanged, 
and number of non-government plaintiffs is unchanged scope is unchanged 
If number of issue areas is unchanged, 
and number of non-government plaintiffs decreases scope decreases 
If number of issue areas decreases, 
and number of non-government plaintiffs increases scope is unclear 
If number if issue areas decreases, 
and number of non-government plaintiffs is unchanged scope decreases 
If number of issue areas decreases, 
and number of non-government plaintiffs decreases scope decreases 
increasing, we infer that the Court's domain is increasing. If the average 
number of cases heard per member state per year is static over time, we infer 
that the Court's domain within the issue areas addressed is unchanged. If the 
average number of cases heard by the ECJ per member state per year decreases 
over time, we infer that within the issue areas addressed, the Court's domain is 
decreasing. 
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The second indicator of the Court’s domain is the average number of 
preliminary rulings issued by the Court per member states per year. Again, a 
two year time lag will be applied to the accession dates of new member states to 
account for any increase in preliminary rulings issued by the Court due simply 
to the increase in member states in the Community. As mentioned above, 
national level courts of member states can appeal to the ECJ for rulings on 
questions of interpretation and validity in cases that involve Community law. 
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Court of Justice can and often 
does issue preliminary rulings, or advisory opinions to the courts of member 
states when they involve a question of Community law. These cases fall under 
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, Article 41 of the Euratom Treaty, and Article 
150 of the ECSC Treaty. 136 Measuring the average number of preliminary 
rulings issued by the Court per member state per year will provide an indication 
of the domain of the Court's authority and perhaps provide an insight into the 
extent to which the courts of member states consider the European Court of 
Justice a legitimate adjudicator. It is up to the discretion of the national courts 
to ask for preliminary mlings from the ECJ. If the national courts consider the 
ECJ legitimate, they will be more inclined to defer to its judgment in questions 
of interpretation of EC law and the validity of institutional acts. Conversely, if 
the national courts of member states do not perceive the ECJ as a legitimate 
adjudicator, they will be less inclined to defer to its judgment. Therefore, the 
136 Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 279, 51,472 respectively. 
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Table 4.6. Potential domain of the Court. 
Variable chanee 
If the average number of ECJ cases increases, 
and the average number of preliminary rulings 
increases 
Outcome 
domain increases 
If the average number of ECJ cases increases, 
and the average number of preliminary rulings is 
unchanged domain increases 
If the average number of ECJ cases increases, 
and the averaga number of preliminary rulings 
decreases domain is unclear 
If the averag number of ECJ cases is unchanged, 
and the average number of preliminary rulings 
increases domain increases 
If the average number of ECJ cases is unchanged, 
and the average number of preliminary rulings 
is unchanged domain is unchanged 
If the average number of ECJ cases is unchanged, 
and the average number of preliminary rulings 
decreases domain decreases 
If the average number of ECJ cases decreases, 
and the average number of preliminary rulings 
increases domain is unclear 
If the average number of ECJ cases decreases, 
and the average number of preliminary rulings is 
unchanged domain decreases 
If the average number of ECJ cases decreases, 
and the average number of preliminary rulings 
decreases domain decreases 
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average number of preliminary rulings issued by the Court per member state per 
year will provide an indication of the degree to which the Court has established 
authority. If the average number per year is increasing, we infer that the courts 
of member states consider the ECJ a legitimate and useful adjudicator for 
questions of Community law. If the average remains the same, we infer that the 
domain of the Court and the extent to which the courts of member states 
perceive the ECJ as legitimate and useful is also unchanged. If the average 
number of preliminary rulings issued by the ECJ per member state per year 
decreases over time, we infer that the domain of the Court is also declining, and 
that the courts of the member states perceive the ECJ as less legitimate and/or 
useful than in previous years. Combined, the indicators of the average number 
of cases heard by the Court per member state per year, and the average number 
of preliminary rulings issued by the ECJ per member state per year will provide 
a measure of the Court's, and by extension the Community's, domain. Table 4.6 
contains the possible outcomes from these combined indicators of domain. 
Any of the possible combinations of results from the indicators of domain 
above will directly affect conclusions about the Court's integration progress. 
When in turn combined with the indicators of Court scope, we can place the 
results of our analysis in the context of Schmitter's paths of integration. Figure 
4.2 is an adaptation of Schmitter's diagram that "unpackages" integration in 
terms of our operationalized definition of scope and domain. By placing the 
results of our indicators of scope and domain in the diagram, a sense of the 
direction of the Court's integration can be determined. 
The "unpackaged" diagram in Figure 4.2 illustrates the potential paths for 
the Court of Justice. By measuring the scope and domain of the Court we can 
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Figure 4.2. Schmitter diagram in terms of scope and domain 
determine the direction of integration in the Community. The number of issue 
areas addressed by the Court and the number of non-government plaintiffs 
bringing cases to the Court provide an indication of Court scope. The average 
number of ECJ cases per member state per year and the average number of 
preliminary rulings issued per member state per year provide an indication of 
the Court's domain. Together these two component parts define integration as 
operationalized it here. If the Court is gaining or losing jurisdictional ground in 
some issue areas or is increasing or decreasing its level of authority within the 
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issue areas in its competence, we can generalize that the Community is doing 
similarly. Assessing the direction of the Community's integration will allow us 
to understand better the potential future role of the European Community in 
international relations. 
The next chapter will provide an analysis of the data. The results of our 
four indicators will be examined and then, in Chapter Six, some inferences will 
be drawn as to the direction of the Court's scope and domain based on the 
analysis. Some of the implications of the results for the Court, the Community 
and international relations will also be discerned. Lastly, areas for further 
integration research on the Court and the Community will be suggested. 
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
In Chapter Four the methodological groundwork for the analysis of the 
data was laid out. The potential paths of integration as delineated by Schmitter 
were reviewed and applied to the Court of Justice, and integration was 
operationalized as a function of the Court's scope and domain. The number of 
issue areas addressed by the Court and the number of non-state plaintiffs 
bringing cases to the Court are the two indicators of scope. The average number 
of ECJ cases decided per member state per year, and the average number of 
preliminary rulings issued by the Court per member state per year, serve as the 
indicators of domain. 
In this chapter the data compiled from the General Report on the 
Activities of the European Communities will be analyzed in terms of these 
indicators of scope and domain. By doing so, a sense of the direction of the 
Court's integration can be gained. By extension, a sense of the Community's 
scope and domain, and therefore, integration path can also be gained. This will 
in turn, in Chapter Six, suggest some conclusions from this research, regarding 
the potential implications of the role of the Court and the Community in 
international relations. 
Scope Indicators 
The first indicator of scope is the number of issue areas addressed by the 
Court. Cases are categorized by the European Commission staff according to 
the legal basis used by the Court in its decision. The cases are first categorized 
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by the treaty under which the proceedings are brought, either the ECSC, 
Euratom, or EEC Treaty. Within the EEC and ECSC Treaty categories, the 
cases are further classified by specific subject matter (refer to table 4.1 for an 
example). The following is a list of issue areas addressed by the Court in 1978: 
Within the ECSC Treaty: 
Scrap compensation 
Transportation 
Competition 
Other: levies, investments, declarations, tax changes, and 
miner's bonuses 137 
Within the EEC Treaty: 
Free movement of goods and customs union 
Right of establishment, freedom to supply services 
Tax cases 
Competition 
Social security and free movement of workers 
Agricultural policy 
Transport 
Convention Article 220 
Other: contentious proceedings, staff regulations, Community 
terminology, Lome Convention, short-term economic 
policy, and relationships between Community law and 
national law 138 
Euratom 
Privileges and Immunities 
Proceedings by staff of institutions 
This list provides a classification of all ECJ cases by issue area addressed. This 
information is also displayed in Figure 5.1. 
137 These issue areas are classified under the ECSC category "other." Commission of the 
European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities. 1978, 367. 
138 These issue areas are classified under the general category "other.” Ibid., 367. 
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The total number of issue areas in 1990 amounted to 31 compared to 27 
issue areas in 1978.139 A cursory glance at both the issue areas is enough to 
indicate that the number of issue areas addressed by the Court has increased 
from 1978 to 1990 but only slightly. In fact, from 1980 up to 1990 the number 
of issue areas was unchanged. 
Table 5.1. Number of issue areas addressed by the Court 
Number of 
issue areas 
1978 27 
1979 28 
1980 29 
1981 30 
1982 30 
1983 30 
1984 30 
1985 30 
1986 30 
1987 30 
1988 30 
1989 30 
1990 31 
139 The data for ancj 1992 is not included in the table or figure above because it was 
incomplete. The Commission did not provide a list of issue areas included in the 
"other" categories in 1991 and 1992 so an accurate comparison was not possible. 
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Figure 5.1. Number of issue areas addressed by the Court 
The Growth and Decline of Issue Areas 
While the number of issue areas addressed by the Court did not change 
significantly between 1978 and 1990, of the issue areas that are in the Court's 
competence some grew in importance and others relative to previous levels. 
The importance of an issue area can be measured in part by the number of cases 
the Court heard within the issue area. A descriptive analysis of the issue areas 
that both grew and declined in importance during this time will provide a sense 
of the areas in which the Court was becoming more or less involved. 
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The importance of an issue area relative to past levels of importance can 
be determined by the way in which issue areas are catogorized. Issue areas in 
which the Court hears more cases constitute a separate category in the tables 
provided by the Commission in their annual reports. Other issue areas in which 
the Court presumably does not hear as many cases are grouped together in the 
Commission report under the category "other." As an issue area becomes more 
or less important it is either promoted or demoted. By tracing the movement of 
issue areas from 1978 through 1990, we can gain a sense of the importance of 
each issue area relative to its prior levels of importance. 
The first issue area change occured in 1980 when the category of 
"production quotas" was added to the "other" category within the ECSC Treaty. 
This was an entirely new issue area for the Court. This can be in part explained 
by the global oil crisis in the 1970s and the Community's efforts to establish 
energy independence and efficiency. In 1978 and 1979, the Community's 
policy, intended to maintain consumption and production capacities, had not 
"progressed sufficiently" for the coal industry to "fulfil the role ascribed to it in 
supplying energy to the Community." 140 The energy crisis in turn negatively 
affected the steel and iron industries which were already struggling. In 1979 
there was a continued decline in investments in the steel industry, so the 
Commission granted loans at reduced interest rates to facilitate the 
reorganization of the steel industry. This was thought necessary if the industry 
was to remain competitive. 141 The domino effect of the oil crisis in the late 
140 The developments in the coal and steel industries are detailed in the General Report on 
the Activities of the European Communities. 1978. 201-206; 1979. 185. 
141 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1979, 57. 
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1970s on other Community industries like steel, iron, and shipbuilding, resulted 
in Community efforts to bolster these industries by establishing minimum prices 
and a voluntary production quota system for iron and steel. The Court became 
involved in both of these corrective measures when a number of steel and iron 
producers took the European Commission to the Court to obtain a ruling on the 
legality of the minimum prices and production quotas set by the Commission. 
In the case S.pA Ferriera Valsabbia and Others v Commission of the European 
Communities the plaintiffs tried to gain an annulment of a series of Commission 
decisions imposing pecuniary penalties for selling concrete reinforcement bars 
below the minimum price established by the Commission. They also asked for 
Commission Decision No. 962/77/ECSC of May 1977 (which established the 
minimum price levels and the production quotas) to be overturned. 142 in its 
ruling, the Court decided that the Commission had not, as the plaintiffs argued, 
violated Article 61 of the ECSC which laid down the procedures for 
establishing minimum price levels and production quotas, nor was it guilty of a 
"mainifest failure to observe the Treaty. 143 
In 1981 "environment" was added to the competence of the Court for the 
first time as an issue area in the "other" general category. Environmental 
concerns were growing gradually in importance within the Community as was 
evident, among other things, by the Action Program for the Environment 
approved by the Council for 1977 through 1981, to assess environmental 
1^2 Case 154/78 S.pA. Ferriera Valsabbia and Others v Commission of the European 
Communities (1980) joined with cases 205, 206, 226-228, 263 and 264/78, 39, 31, 83 
and 85/79. European Court Reports. (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, 1980): 913. 
I43 Ibid., 1044. 
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impacts in project appraisals for projects before the Community. 144 TThis 
increased importance was reflected in the Court which was beginning to address 
more cases regarding Community environmental policy. For example, the 
Court began to hear more cases involving the infringement of Article 169 of the 
EEC Treaty by member states. Article 169 reads, 
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed 
to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned 
opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the 
opportunity to submit its observations. 
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion 
within the period laid down by the Commission, the later may 
bring the matter before the Court of Justice. 145 
A number of the infringement cases were due to incorrect implementation or 
non-implementation by member states of Community directives on 
environmental policy, according to the Commission's annual report. 146 For 
example, Italy was found in violation of certain environmental directives 
relating to the use of fertilizers. 147 in the case Commission of the European 
Communities v Italian Republic the Italian government was found guilty of non- 
144 Norman Lee and Christopher Wood, "The Assessement of Environmental Impacts in 
Project Appraisal in the European Communities," Journal of Common Market 
Studies 16 (March 1978): 189-193. 
145 Article 169, "EEC Treaty," in Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 1987, 
276. 
146 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1982, 294. 
147 Ibid., 295. 
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compliance with Council Directive No. 76/116/EEC of December 1975.148 
This directive established new Community-wide methods for sampling and 
analyzing fertilizers, established new provisions relating to the designation and 
composition of straight and compound fertilizers, and set new standards for the 
packaging and labelling of those fertilizers. 149 in this particular case Italy had 
not adopted any of the measures necessary to comply with the directive. 150 
Cases like this where the question revolves around Community environmental 
law probably contributed to the Commission’s decision to add "environment" to 
the general "other" category in 1982. 
"Environment" was taken out of the general category "other" and was 
made a separate category in 1991. This appears to be a response to efforts on 
the part of Community institutions to link environmental policy to the overall 
economic policies of the Community as required under Article 130r of the EEC 
Treaty as amended by the Single European Act in 1987.151 Increased efforts 
were made to link environmental policies to the common agricultural policy, 
148 Case 44/80 Commisssion of the European Communities v Italian Republic (1981). 
European Court Reports. 344-347. 
149
 Ibid., 347. 
150 in this case, Italy argued that Italian law required special legislative measures be 
adopted in order to implement the Community directive and that a draft version of the 
necessary measures was in the legislature at the time of the Court's proceedings. The 
Court's response was to reinforce previous case law regarding non-compliance due to 
national legal requirements. It ruled that national legal requirements were not 
sufficient justification for non-compliance with Community law. Ibid., 351-359. 
151 Article 130r lays out the goals of Community environmental policy and states the 
principle of preventative action as the basis of Community action along with the need 
for the polluter to pay costs to rectify damages. It also states "environmental 
protection requirements shall be a component of the Community's other policies." 
Article 130r of the "EEC Treaty," in Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities. 247. 
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energy, transport, and internal market policies. 152 por example, in the case 
Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, 
Germany was found in violation of Council Directive 80/799/EEC of July 1980 
which established air quality values for sulfur dioxide and lead. 153 Germany 
had not adopted all of the measures necessary to comply with the Directive and 
therefore had failed to fulfill its obligations under Community law. While this 
case did not fall under Article 130r, it serves to illustrate the connection 
between Community environmental law and other aspects of Community law. 
The case could have been brought under Article 130r if the air pollution had 
been the result of a new incineration plant funded by state aid (aid provided by 
states for undertakings in order to compensate for some disadvantage), for 
example. The new "environment" category also may have been a reflection of 
Community involvement in international planning for the upcoming United 
Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June of 1992.154 
There were no other additions or mergers of issue areas until 1990 when 
"state aid" was promoted out of the "other" category and added to "competition" 
under the EEC Treaty. Aids granted by states are addressed under article 92 
and 93 of the EEC Treaty, and refer to the following circumstances: 
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by 
a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever 
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
152
 Ibid., 197-212. 
153 Cases 361/88 and 59/89 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic 
of Germany (1991). European Court Reports. 1991. 2568. 2609. 
154 This involvement as well as Community efforts to assist Central and East European 
countries in environmental clean-up, could have contributed to the new emphasis on 
environmental issues. Ibid., 198. 
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certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so 
far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with 
the common market. 155 
While there are exceptions to the rule above, they refer to special 
circumstances, such as allowing for state aid in order to correct damages 
resulting from natural disasters, or to promote economic development of areas 
with an abnormally low standard of living or severe underemployment. 156 The 
growth in state aid cases brought to the Court can be explained in large part by a 
new program undertaken by the Commission to review all state aid programs. 
The Commission's Report explains, 
Most aid awards are made under schemes which in many 
cases were approved some years ago; the Commission therefore 
embarked upon a sytematic review of all sytems of aid existing in 
the Member States...The review, which is being carried out under 
Article 93(1) of the EEC Treaty, should enable changes in the 
economic and industrial situation due to the completion of the 
internal market to be taken into account." 157 
Article 93 allows the Commission to review all state aid programs, and if a 
program is not in compliance with Article 92, refer the matter to the Court of 
Justice. This is precisely what happened in 1990, and this increase in state aid 
cases likely resulted in the addition of "state aid" to "competition" cases under 
155 Article 92, "EEC Treaty," in Treaties Establishing the European Communties. 1987, 
198. 
156 Article 92, section 2 (b), 3 (a), Ibid., 198. 
» 
157 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1990, 99. 
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the Commission's categorization of Court cases. The case Commission of the 
European Communities v Hellenic Republic serves as a good example of a state 
aid case. Greek law No. 1256/82 of May 1982 provided that "all public 
property including the assets of Greek undertakings must be insured exclusively 
with Greek public sector insurance companies." 158 The Commission, arguing 
under Article 90 of the EEC Treaty that Greece had provided a monopoly to 
Greek insurance companies, took the dispute to the Court. 159 The Court mled 
Greece was in violation of Article 90 and had failed to fulfill its obligation 
under Community law by providing state aid to Greek insurance companies via 
the Greek law. 160 
An example of a competition case not dealing with state aid, can be found 
in a preliminary ruling requested by the Tribunal de Commerce in Liege, Louis 
Erauw-Jacquery SPRL v La Hesbignonne SC. 161 The case revolved around an 
agreement concerning plant breeders' rights in respect of certain varieties of 
seeds (specifically Gerbel multi-row winter barley), and its compatibility with 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. Article 85 states which actions are explicitly 
prohibited as incompatible with the common market: 
158 Case 226/87 Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic (1988). 
European Court Reports. 1988, 3612. 
159 Article 90 of the EEC Treaty states that in public undertakings "entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a 
revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in 
particular to the rules of competition..." EEC Treaty, Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities. 197. 
160 Case 226/87 Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic (1988). 
European Court Reports. 1988, 3614-3625. 
161 Case 27/87 (1988). European Court Reports. 1988. 1919-1942. 
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All agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States and which have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchasing or selling prices of 
any other trading conditions... 162 
The defendant in this case was authorized to sell and propagate in Belgium the 
species held by the plaintiff, under an agreement which prohibited exporting 
without the written authorization of the plaintiff. The agreement also allowed a 
base minimum price for the sale of the seeds fixed by the plaintiff. 163 The 
Court ruled that the breeder is entitled to restrict exportation and that the 
agreement was compatible with Article 85 in that respect. It further ruled that 
price fixing is prohibited under Article 85 (1) "only if it is found, having regard 
to the economic and legal context of the agreement containing the provision in 
question, that the agreement is capable of affecting trade between Member 
States to an appreciable degree." 164 As in all preliminary rulings, the ECJ only 
rules on the interpretation of Community law. It was left to the national court to 
then apply the law to the case at hand. This case is representative of 
competition cases overall. Other areas included in competition law address 
dominant positions of undertakings within the common market (Article 86), 
public undertakings and the prevention of monopolies (Article 90, as discussed 
162 Article 85, EEC Treaty. Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 193. 
163 Case 27/87 (1988). European Court Reports. 1988. 1920-1921. 
164 ibid., 1941. 
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in the case Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic 
above), the practice of "dumping," (Article 91), and state aid (Article 92). 165 
"State aid" itself, became a separate category in 1991, implying a further 
increase in importance. This appears to be a result of the increase in cases 
before the Court, due to the Commission’s continued review of state aid 
programs for their compatibility with EEC Article 92. 
At the same time "state aid" was taken out of "competition," 
"competition" was divided into "direct actions" and "appeals," most likely to 
account for appeals in competition cases from the newly functioning Court of 
First Instance. Beginning in late 1989, the Court of First Instance became the 
trial court for certain competition cases, all of which can be appealed to the 
Court of Justice. 
In 1991 the Commission's classification scheme was significantly 
revamped as four issue areas were promoted out of the "other" category. 
"Fisheries" became a separate category, possibly as a result of the Commission's 
continued review of state aid programs. The Commission initiated proceedings 
in seven cases of state aid to fisheries as part of its overall review of state aid 
programs. 166 Although not a state aid case, the case Commission of the 
European Communities v France serves as a representative example of a 
fisheries case. 167 France had exceeded its catch quota for redfish in Faerose 
waters and for "other species" (meaning other species of fish caught in the 
165 EEC Treaty. Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 193-206. 
166 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1991, 196. 
167 Case 244/89 (1991). European Court Reports. 1991,163-198. 
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process of fishing for redfish) in Norwegian waters. The catch quotas for 
member states had been established by the EC Council as authorized in the 
Fisheries Agreement between the EEC and the Government of Denmark and the 
Home Government of the Faroe Islands in 1982.168 France admitted it had 
exceeded the catch quotas but only because of "management difficulties" in 
getting the catch information back from the remote fishing region. In its 
decision, the Court ruled that France had exceeded the catch quotas and had 
therefore failed to fulfill its obligations under the Council Regulation No. 
2057/82 of June 1982. The Court decided that the French argument for having 
exceeded the quotas due to management difficulties was not sufficient cause for 
failing to meet the quotas. 169 
The last new issue area that grew in importance in 1991 was "dumping," 
which was added to "commercial policy" as a combined category. Dumping is 
addressed under the EEC Treaty under Article 91, and refers to the practice of 
selling a product abroad at a price lower than the price in the domestic market. 
Dumping is often practiced to obtain market shares in a foreign market and/or 
to eliminate competing businesses by driving prices so low they are unable to 
compete. Anti-dumping laws in the Community in 1991 were more visible 
before the Court of Justice possibly in part because the Court had to determine 
the compatibility of Community law with the anti-dumping code established in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Court did decide 
that the two anti-dumping codes were compatible, but acknowledged that a 
168
 Ibid., 165. 
169
 Ibid., 169-198. 
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wide range of discretion in interpreting the codes existed. 170 in the case 
Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd. v Council of the European Communities the 
Court ruled on an anti-dumping duty on dot-matrix printers originating in 
Japan.171 Nakajima argued before the ECJ that the Commission had failed to 
investigate thoroughly enough, the alleged need for an anti-dumping duty and 
that the Council's failure to state why the duty was being applied made the 
action illegal under Community law. 172 in \ts decision, the Court ruled, inter 
alia, that the Commission had conducted a thorough investigation of the alleged 
dumping and that the Council had provided a complete reasoning for the 
implementation of the duty, therfore the Court dismissed the case. 173 This case 
was important because it was the first case in which the Court established the 
legality of the Community's new anti-dumping code and found it compatible 
with the GATT anti-dumping codes. 
The category of "free movement of goods and customs union" was 
divided into two categories, "free movement of goods" and "customs." Free 
movement of goods refers to Title I of the EEC Treaty addressing the removal 
of quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having an equivalent 
effect. Customs union refers to the elimination of customs duties on imports 
and exports and all charges having equivalent effect within the Community. 174 
170 Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. v Council. Ibid., 428. 
171 Case 69/89 (1991). European Court Reports. 1991. 2069-2204. 
172 ibid., 2080-2104. 
173 Ibid., 2204. 
174 Articles 9-37, EEC Treaty. Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 135-151. 
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The case Commission of the European Comunities v Kingdom of Belgium 
serves as a representative example of free movement of goods cases. In this 
case the Court ruled that Belgium failed to fulfill its obligations under 
Community law by violating Article 30 of the EEC Treaty, which states, 
"Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect 
shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between 
Member States." 175 Belgium had passed legislation that "laid down criteria for 
determining the minimum and maximum price of pharmaceutical products 
which refer to factors peculiar to the Belgian market," and did not account for 
the costs related to importing in that the maximum price was low relative to 
prices elsewhere and to the cost of imports. 176 The iaw further allowed for 
contracts of pharmaceuticals which permitted price rises subject to conditions 
which could only be met by domestic products. 177 The Court ruled that on 
both aspects of the Belgian law, Belgium had failed to fulfill its obligations 
under Community law by violating Article 30 of the EEC Treaty. 
Most customs union cases are either questions of how to classify a 
product to determine the appropriate customs tariff, or questions asking which 
of the component parts of the product can be included in the assessment of the 
tariff. For example in the case Nordgetranke GmbH and Co. KG v 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Ericus the Court ruled that apricot puree made by 
"pressing fruit pulp through a sieve and bringing the puree thus obtained to 
175
 Article 30, EEC Treaty, Ibid., 146-149. 
176 Case 249/88 Commission of the European Communities (1991). European Court 
Reports. 1991, 1275-1287. 
177
 Ibid., 1287. 
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boiling point in a vacuum concentrator for no more than thrity seconds" was not 
to be regarded as fruit puree, but as "fruit otherwise prepared or preserved" 
because the boiling process did not alter the taste and chemical properties of the 
product, as is the case with fruit puree. 178 
An example of the latter type of customs case is provided in the case 
Brown Boveri & Co. AG v Hauptzollamt MannheimX79 This revolved around 
the question of whether the customs tariff for an imported computer assisted 
design system should include the cost of transportation in the country of 
importation, the value of the software, and the assembly costs. 180 The Court 
ruled that under Commission Regulation No. 1224/80/EEC the costs of the 
software could not be deducted, and for the assembly costs to be deducted they 
need to be distinguished in the customs declaration at the time the goods go 
through customs. The costs of transportation within the country of importation, 
however, could be deducted. 181 
The separation of the categories "free movement of goods" and "customs 
union" seems to be due in part, to a large number of new Community directives 
and regulations established to meet the 1992 program deadline for completing 
the internal market. Examples are numerous, but a few will serve to illustrate 
the point here. In 1990, the Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation 
establishing a Community Customs Code "which consolidates the corpus of 
178
 Ibid., 1927-1939. 
179 Case 79/89 Brown Boveri & Co. AG v Hauptzollamt Mannheim (1991). European Court 
Repons. 1991. 1853-1894. 
180 Ibid., 1853-1854. 
181
 Ibid., 1890-1894. 
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customs rules in a single text and, together with the appropriate implementing 
regulations, will ensure greater legal transparency from 1993 onwards." 182 
Proceedings were also taken under Article 169 EEC in order to establish 
equivalent effect on import duties, and the Commission continued to "pressure 
the Council to speed the adoption of provisions needed to settle difficult 
questions of interpretation under Community law." 183 Also the 1992 program 
aimed at removing all barriers to free trade by the end of 1992, consists of 
changes many of which fall under "free movement of goods" and "customs". 184 
The establishment of both of these areas as separate categories reflects their 
probable increase in number of cases. Since many of the internal market 
barriers still exist and the deadline has not been met, it seems reasonable to 
expect that heightened Community activity will continue in these areas. 
At the same time these issue areas were growing in importance, other 
issue areas were declining in importance relative to previous levels. These 
declines are visible in the fewer number of cases heard by the Court within 
these issue areas. "Privileges and immunities" was combined with "convention 
Article 220” and all four of the categories under the ECSC Treaty, including 
"other," were collapsed into "direct actions" and "appeals" under the ECSC 
Treaty. 185 "Article 220 conventions" refers to Article 220 of the EEC Treaty 
182 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1990, 63. 
183
 Ibid., 64-5. 
184 Nugent. The Government and Politics of the European Community. 391. 
185 Ibid., 452. 
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which addresses bilateral negotiations among member states meant to establish 
reciprocal treatment of nationals. It reads, 
Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into 
negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefit 
of their nationals: the protection of persons and the enjoyment and 
protection of rights under the same conditions as those accorded by 
each State to its own nationals; the abolition of double taxation 
within the Community; the mutual recognition of companies and 
firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, the 
retention of legal personality in the event of transfer of their seat 
from one country to another, and the possibility of mergers 
between companies or firms governed by the laws of different 
countries; the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal 
recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals 
and of arbitration awards. 186 
The combining of "privileges and immunities" with "Article 220 conventions" 
is a reflection of fewer cases being brought to the Court in these areas. 
"Privileges and immunities" refers to the protection of Council and Commission 
members when on official Community business throughout the EC. 
The collapsing of categories under the ECSC Treaty into "direct actions" 
and "appeals" is most likely a response to the creation of the Court of First 
Instance. ECSC cases fall under this new court's jurisdiction except in certain 
specific circumstances. 187 The creation of the Court of First Instance, along 
186 Article 220 of the "EEC Treaty," in Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 
308. 
187 The Court of First Instance has immediate jurisdiction in ECSC cases unless it is a 
request for a preliminary ruling, or if the case is brought by a member state or by a 
Community institution. In all of these exceptions, the Court of Justice has immediate 
jurisdiction. Article 4, "Single European Act," in Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities. 537. 
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with the other changes in issue areas addressed by the ECJ have combined to 
gradually alter the composition of the ECJ's case load from 1978 to 1992. 
At the same time, the collapsing of other issue areas into combined 
categories suggests that the Court was hearing fewer cases in those areas. 
Whether this was due to increased involvement on the part of other Community 
institutions, therefore requiring a lesser role for the Court, or by the clarification 
of legal questions within those issue areas, therefore requiring a lesser role for 
the Court, or by some other reason, is not clear. It is probably due in part to 
both increased involvement by other Community institutions and a reduced 
need for clarification of Community law within those areas. 
Based on the virtually unchanged number of issue areas addressed by the 
Court in the early 1990s, we infer that the number of issue areas addressed by 
the Court is not increasing to any real degree. We further infer that the scope of 
the Court is unchanging because its areas of competence are unchanging. This 
indicator combined with the number of non-govemment plaintiffs bringing 
cases to the Court, will provide a fuller indication of the direction of the Court's 
scope. 
The number of non-govemment plaintiffs bringing cases to the Court also 
serves as an indication of the Court's scope. The number of non-govemment 
plaintiffs suggests the extent to which these plaintiffs perceive the Court of 
Justice as legitimate and useful. It may also suggest the extent to which the 
Court of Justice is replacing national level courts as the court of choice. Table 
5.3 shows the number of both government and non-govemment plaintiffs 
(individuals and Community institutions) bringing cases to the Court every year 
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Table 5.3. ECJ cases analyzed by type of plaintiff bringing the case 
Government 
plaintiffs 
Non-government 
plaintiffs 
1978 
1979 21 
1980 8 13 
1981 3 53 
1982 7 72 
1983 6 41 
1984 6 70 
1985 28 81 
1986 26 74 
1987 19 89 
1988 20 35 
1989 20 79 
1990 22 26 
1991 10 40 
1992 29 29 
from 1979 through 1992.188 Figure 5.3 illustrates the number of non¬ 
government plaintiffs bringing cases to the Court each year. Figure 5.4 
analyzes the data in terms of the average number of non-government plaintiffs 
bringing cases to the Court of Justice before the passage of the Single European 
Act (SEA) from 1979-1986, and after its passage from 1987 through 1992. The 
The figures for 1978 were not available, nor was the number of government plaintiffs in 
1979. Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities 
of the European Communities. 1979-1992. 
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Single European Act was chosen as a pivotal event in Community and Court 
activities because it signalled the largest reinvigoration of Community 
integration efforts in the period from 1978 to 1992. This analysis is intended to 
provide a larger perspective than the yearly data and may illustrate more clearly 
if an integration trend is emerging, and if so, in which direction it is going. 
Analysis of the data on plaintiff types from all of these approaches will provide 
an insight as to whether non-govemment plaintiffs are bringing more cases to 
the Court. 
The number of cases brought to the Court by non-govemment plaintiffs 
each year in Figure 5.3 appears to be much like a bell curve. The number of 
non-govemment plaintiffs was relatively low in 1979 and 1980, but then began 
to climb in 1981. The years 1982, 1985, 1987, and 1989 all seem to have 
exceptionally high numbers of non-govemment plaintiffs. But perhaps the most 
curious aspect of the data is that it tapers off so much after 1989. This tapering 
off in the early 1990s, and the lack of an upward trend contradicts the 
hypotheses put forth by neofunctionalists and suggested in this study. When the 
picture in Figure 5.4 (pre- and post-SEA) is added to the analysis, any possible 
upward trend seems even more unlikely. In the period prior to the passage of 
the SEA from 1979 through 1986, the average number of non-govemment 
plaintiffs bringing cases to the Court was 53. After the SEA went into force in 
1987 through 1992, the average number of non-govemment plaintiffs was 50 
per year, indicating a decline of three non-govemment plaintiffs on average per 
year. While this may or may not be a meaningful change, it is a decline 
suggesting that the Court is not attracting more non-govemment plaintiffs than 
it did in previous years. The years with high numbers of non-govemment 
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plaintiffs can in part be explained by the specific issue areas that were 
developing and heating up in those years. A complete discussion of these boom 
years, can be found in the next section on the domain indicator of average 
number of cases per member state heard by the Court each year. The same 
years (1982, 1985,1987, and 1989) appear to have exceptionally high numbers 
of both non-government plaintiffs bringing cases to the Court and total cases 
heard by the Court (the first indicator of domain). 
Figure 5.3. Non-government plaintiffs bringing cases to the Court of Justice 
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Figure 5.4. Average number of non-government plaintiffs per year before and 
after the Single European Act 
From this analysis of the number of non-government plaintiffs bringing 
cases to the Court of Justice, it is apparent that the Court is not attracting more 
non-government plaintiffs over time. This is the case when analyzed by 
individual yearly figures and when analyzed in relation to the Single European 
Act in 1987. The decline in average number of non-govemment plaintiffs from 
53 before and 50 after the SEA is probably not meaningful. We can infer from 
the data on non-govemment plaintiffs that the scope of the Court is unchanging. 
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This indicates that non-government plaintiffs may no longer perceive the 
Court as legitimate and useful to the extent that they have in the past. It also 
suggests that the Court of Justice is not replacing national level courts as the 
court of choice among non-government plaintiffs. From all of this analysis of 
the use of the Court by non-govemment plaintiffs, we infer that the scope of the 
Court is itself unchanging, because the Court has not been able to attract more 
non-govemment plaintiffs, and appears to be losing some of its past clientele, 
though only minimally. The analysis of non-govemment plaintiffs based on the 
periods before and after the SEA, suggests that this decrease is slight, and the 
yearly analysis indicates that there is no clear upward trend, or even an 
established plateau. Instead, in the yearly analysis there is a visible peak in 
1987 and then decline in non-govemment plaintiffs. Why this peak occurred is 
not clear, though a few possibilities can be considered. It may be that the bulk 
of legal questions for non-govemment plaintiffs have been answered by the 
Court and that most of the remaining questions revolve around member state 
obligations. The increase of Article 169 cases (failure of member states to 
fulfill obligations under Community law) may be a reflection of this. It may 
also be the case that the new regulations and directives established in the years 
leading up to the Single European Act combined with the legislation passed to 
meet the 1992 deadline of the barrier-free internal market caused a marked 
increase in cases brought by non-govemment plaintiffs, which has since tapered 
off. Or it may be that more non-govemment plaintiffs are opting to bring their 
disputes to national level courts with the hopes that the home court advantage 
will have an effect. Purely based on cost, it is more expensive to bring a case 
before the European Court of Justice than a national level court, and this alone 
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may have affected the number of non-government plaintiffs before the ECJ. 
Some or all of these reasons may have contributed to the slight decline in non¬ 
government plaintiffs bringing cases to the ECJ. 
Combined analysis of the two indicators of scope, number of issue areas 
addressed by the Court and the number of non-government plaintiffs bringing 
cases to the Court, suggests minimal, and most likely irrelevant, changes. The 
number of issue areas addressed by the Court indicates that the Court's scope is 
virtually unchanged. Similarly, the slight decline in number of non-government 
plaintiffs bringing cases to the Court suggests that the scope of the Court 
essentially is unchanged. 
This first dimension of integration combined with an analysis of the 
domain of the Court will provide some insight as to the general direction of 
integration of the Court, and by extension, the Community. It may also provide 
insight as to the role of the Court in contributing to the Community's integration 
process. 
Domain Indicators 
Domain refers to the degree of authority held by the Court within its area 
of competence. The first indicator of domain is the average number of ECJ 
cases per member state per year. This is a measure of the ratio of number of 
cases heard by the Court each year to the number of member states in the 
Community. In order to account for the lag between the time a case is brought 
to the Court and the time a decision is delivered, a two year time delay has been 
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added to the accession date of new member states. 189 As a result, the 
accession of Greece in 1981 is not counted in the number of member states in 
the Community until 1983 and the accessions of Spain and Portugal are not 
added until 1988. This will prevent including new member states in yearly 
figures when they could not have received a Court decision yet due to the time 
needed to process cases. The total number of ECJ cases each year, the number 
of member states in the Community (with the two year time lag), and the 
number of ECJ cases per member state per year are listed in Table 5.4. For 
1991 and 1992 the cases before the Court of First Instance have been added to 
the ECJ total. All of these cases were included in the ECJ's case load prior to 
the establishment of the Court of First Instance, so this addition is necessary if 
these years are to be accurately compared to earlier years. Figure 5.5 illustrates 
the total number of ECJ cases heard by the Court per year. Figure 5.6 illustrates 
the average number of ECJ cases per member state per year, accounting for the 
two year lag time needed to process a case. In addition, Figure 5.7 shows the 
average number of ECJ cases heard by the Court before the passage of the 
Single European Act from 1978 through 1986, compared to after the Single 
European Act from 1987 through 1992. Again, the SEA was chosen because it 
signalled the largest reinvigoration of Community integration efforts in the 
period from 1978 to 1992. This analysis is intended to provide a larger 
perspective than the yearly data, and may illustrate more clearly if an 
integration trend is emerging, and if so, in which direction it is going. 
189 Micheal Kenny, staff lawyer for the European Court of Justice, telephone interview by 
author, 27 May 1993, Luxembourg. 
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Table 5.4. Average number of ECJ cases per member state per year 
number of 
cases 
per year 
number of 
member 
states 
number of 
cases per member 
state per year 
1978 115 9 12.78 
1979 239 9 26.56 
1980 168 9 18.67 
1981 149 9 16.56 
1982 233 9 25.89 
1983 206 10 20.60 
1984 220 10 22.00 
1985 254 10 25.40 
1986 196 10 19.60 
1987 317 10 31.70 
1988 311 12 25.92 
1989 253 12 21.08 
1990 283 12 23.58 
1991 278 12 23.17 
1992 350 12 29.17 
Looking at Figure 5.5, the total number of ECJ cases seems to be 
increasing between 1978 and 1992, though not unidirectionally. There are 
clearly some years in which the total number of ECJ cases is exceptionally high. 
1979, 1982, 1985, 1987, 1988, and potentially 1992, are all examples of 
apparent boom years for the Court. Closer examination of the Court's docket in 
these specific years provides some insight as to why the Court experienced 
these increases in case load. 
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Figure 5.5. Number of ECJ cases per year 
1979 was the first year of the European Monetary System and the first 
year of direct elections to the European Parliament. It also was the first year the 
European Parliament did not approve the Community budget resulting in the 
use of a "provisional-twelfths" budget system under EEC Treaty Article 
204.190 This provisional system was used until a budget was approved, six 
months later. 191 In terms of the Court's docket, agriculture cases increased 
190 Article 204 of the EEC Treaty allows for the equivalent of one-twelfth of the budget 
appropriations for the preceding financial year to be spent each month until the 
budget is approved. The Council can spend, with a majority vote, more than one- 
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Figure 5.6. Average number of ECJ cases per member state per year with 
two-year accession date delay 
from 48 in 1978 to 101 in 1979, to account for the largest issue area increase. 
Another noticeable increase occured in competition cases which jumped from 4 
in 1978 to 53 in 1979. The increase in agriculture cases can be explained in 
twelfth, provided other conditions are met. "EEC Treaty," in Treaties Establishing 
the European Communities. 295; referenced in the General Report on the Activities of 
the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities, 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1978). 
19. 
*91 Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Community. 402. 
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part by an increase in infringement procedures under Article 169 of the EEC 
Treaty against member states, of which agriculture "was the dominant sector," 
meaning a large number of these Article 169 cases were due to infringements of 
Community agricultural policy. 192 As discussed above, Article 169 provides 
for a procedure by which the Commission can bring cases to the Court against 
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Figure 5.7. Average number of ECJ cases before and after the Single 
European Act of 1987 
192 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1979, 279. 
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member states if they fail to properly implement a Community directive or 
regulation. 193 
Many of these Article 169 cases involved quantitative restrictions under 
the provisions of Title 2 of the EEC Treaty, which addresses agriculture policy 
and Article 30 which addresses quantitative restrictions on the free movement 
of goods. For example, in the case Comission of the European Communities v 
Federal Republic of Germany Germany was found in breach of Article 30 for 
forbidding imports of meat products from member states manufactured in any 
of those states from meat originating in a different member state. 194 The case 
originated from a complaint by a Dutch manufacturer of pork-tongue sausage 
who used among his ingredients, pork-tongues imported from the United 
States. 195 Although Germany tried to justify its action on the grounds of 
"protection of health and life of humans" (which would provide an exemption 
under Article 36), the Court ruled that the ban on imports was prima facie 
forbidden by Article 30.196 Similarly, a case was brought against the United 
Kingdom for import restrictions on potatoes from Denmark and another case 
was brought against France for import restrictions on sheepmeat from the 
193 Article 169, of the "EEC Treaty," in Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 
276. 
194 Case 153/78 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany 
(1979). European Court Reports. 1979, 2555-2569. 
195 Ibid., 2569. 
196 Ibid., 2569-2574. 
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United Kingdom. 197 These cases are representative of the type of agriculture 
cases that contributed to an increase in the Court's case load. 
The increased number of competition cases appear to be the result of a 
series of cases in 1978 meant to clarify Community law under Article 86 of the 
EEC Treaty which defines abuse of a dominant position within the common 
market. Abuse is defined as: 
...directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchasing or selling prices 
or other unfair trading conditions; limiting production, markets or 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers; applying 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts. 198 
Case 27/76 United Brands Co. v Commission decided in 1978, along with three 
other critical cases, helped the Court to clarify this definition of abuse of a 
dominant position but not before a number of similar cases were placed on the 
Court's docket. 199 
1982 saw a near tripling of agriculture cases brought before the Court of 
Justice, which contributed to the significant jump in total cases before the 
197 Cases 118/78 and 232/78, referenced in Commission of the European Communities, 
General Report on the Activities of the European Communities. 1979, 291, 625. 
198 Article 86, of the "EEC Treaty," in Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 
194. 
199 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1978, 303. 
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Court.200 The budget crisis in 1979 had carried over in terms of continued 
budget problems, and from 1980 through 1984 budget talks were held with the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) at the center of the debates.201 The 1982 
jump in cases may also be in part a result of new changes in the market 
organization for Mediterranean agricultural products. These changes were 
brought about due to the accession of Greece where thirty percent of the 
workforce is in agriculture.202 Greece’s accession caused many changes in 
Community agriculture policy which was being revamped in 1981 and 1982. 
Lastly, some cases brought to the Court in 1982 questioned the validity of 
certain provisions of the regulation on the new common market organization in 
sheepmeat and goatmeat.203 All of these changes in Community agricultural 
policy appear to have contributed to an increased number of agriculture cases 
before the Court, and therefore a noticeable increase in number of cases overall 
in 1982. 
The high number of cases before the Court in 1985 seems to be the result 
of a general increase in most issue areas, but especially in cases under "free 
movement of goods and customs," which increased from 27 in 1984 to 51 in 
1985.204 This virtual doubling in cases seems to be the result of several 
200 The number of agriculture cases went from 26 in 1981 to 82 in 1982. Commission of 
the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities. 1982, 338. 
201 Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945, 188. 
202 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1982. 152-3. 
203 ibid., 153. 
204 Comission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1985, 392. 
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changes in Community law. It was in June of 1985 that the Commission 
published and the Council approved the White Paper completing the internal 
market.205 in December of that year the European Council also approved the 
principles of the SEA 206 Specifically related to customs law, on 7 May 1985, 
a new approach to technical harmonization was adopted by the Council and the 
Common Customs Tariff (CCT) was scheduled to go into effect 1 January 
1986. As for the Court's activities, the Commission brought cases to the Court 
against member states in 113 cases (as compared to 54 in 1984) of which 73 
were for the incorrect implementation or non-implementation of Community 
directives relating to the free movement of goods.207 These free movement of 
goods cases combined with other changes in customs laws contributed to the 
increase in Court cases in 1985. 
1987 saw an increase in Court cases in many issue areas, but increases 
were most concentrated in agriculture and staff proceedings.208 in 1986 the 
Single European Act (SEA) was signed, signalling a new effort at Community 
integration through the elimination of internal market barriers by 1992, further 
attempts at political cooperation, and cooperation toward monetary union, 
among others.209 in February of 1987, the President of the Commission, 
205 Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Community. 403-404. 
206
 Ibid., 403-404. 
207 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1985, 91, 101, 353. 
208 Agriculture cases went from 29 in 1986 to 66 in 1987 and staff proceedings went from 
42 in 1986 to 106 in 1987. Commission of the European Communities, General 
Report on the Activities of the European Communities. 1987, 397. 
209 Single European Act," in Treaties Establishing the European Communities. 523-569. 
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Jacques Delors presented his program for 1987 including a proposal for 
completing the reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP).210 The CAP 
reforms in 1987 were intended mainly as "reinforcement and extension of 
producer co-responsibility, flexibility of the intervention arrangements and 
price restraint."211 These reforms coupled with a Council agreement in 
December of 1986 on milk and beef/veal reforms seem to have contributed to 
the rise in agriculture cases.212 The increase in staff proceedings is less easily 
traced. In 1986 the Council adopted a new regulation on "the five-yearly 
verification of salary weightings," which may have contributed to the increase 
in staff proceedings. This may have been the case, since the Council regulation 
"departed considerably from the Commission's proposal" causing the 
Commission to refer the matter to the Court of Justice.213 
In 1988 the Court saw continued growth in the number of cases in most 
all issue areas. The largest increase in 1988 occured in competition cases- 
meaning cases dealing with free competition, such as monopolies, dumping, 
and state aid— which more than doubled.214 The general increase in cases as 
well as the increase specifically in competition cases in 1988, is likely a result 
210 Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Community. 386. 
211 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1987, 224. 
212 Ibid., 396. 
213 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1986, 44-45. 
214 Competition cases jumped from 13 in 1987 to 28 in 1988. Commission of the European 
Communities, General Report on the Activities of the European Communities, 1988, 
448. 
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of the Single European Act and the new regulations that accompanied it. One 
case falling under competition law in 1988, for example, revolved around the 
question of whether a French law reserving the provision of "external services" 
for funerals (services outside the church or sanctuary, such as transportation of 
the body) where the "holders of concessions in a number of communities 
covering a large part of the national territory belong to a single group of 
undertakings and can thus influence patterns of trade is the result of the conduct 
of the undertakings and not of the national or municipal authorities."215 This 
was a preliminary ruling so the Court only ruled on the interpretation of 
Community law, particularly monopolies under Article 37 of the EEC Treaty. 
The Court ruled that Article 37 only applies insofar as the monopoly "exerts an 
appreciable influence on trade between Member States by discriminating 
against imported products."216 
The increase in competition cases may also be attributed in part to the 
stronger emphasis on aid provided by member states to national industries and 
firms. In 1987 the Court delivered several opinions regarding Articles 92 and 
93 (see discussion above). For example, the Court, in Belgium v Commission 
217 ruled that aid provided by Belgium to the the firm Tubemeuse, a 
manufacturer of seamless tubes, violated Article 93(3) which, inter alia, 
requires member states to notify the Commission prior to distributing planned 
2^5 Case 30/87 Corinn Bodson v Pompes funebres des regions liberees S/t (1988). 
European Court Reports. 1988, 2479-2480. 
216 ibid., 2505. 
217 Case 142/87R, referenced by Commission of the European Communities, General 
Report on the Activities of the European Communities. 1987, 361. 
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aid.218 Belgium claimed that the aid already given to Tubemeuse could not be 
recovered without seriously risking the survival of the firm and the confidence 
of its creditors. On the question of recovery of the aid, the Court dismissed the 
Belgian application on the grounds that the case for serious or irreparable 
damage, due to the recovery attempts by Belgium (ordered by the Court of 
Justice), would have to be made by Tubemeuse under Belgian law in order to 
show that no national remedies existed.219 This is an example of a new 
development in state aid cases, which in 1988 fell under the issue area of 
"competition," and contributed to the increased number of cases before the 
Court in 1988. 
1992 may also prove to have a high number of total cases compared to 
other years. In 1992, both agriculture and taxation cases increased noticeably. 
Cases in agriculture rose from 41 in 1991 to 51 in 1992, and taxation cases rose 
from 17 to 26.220 Most other issue areas varied only slightly in number of 
cases. The sensitive and volatile nature of agricultural policy has already been 
described above in reference to other years with high numbers of agriculture 
cases. In 1992, a series of cases were brought to the Court regarding 
Community legislation establishing milk quotas in 1984. The 1984 legislation 
in question failed to grant quotas to producers that had agreed to stop marketing 
milk for a limited time period, therefore entitling them to receive payments for 
218
 Ibid., 361. 
219 ibid., 361-2. 
220 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1992, 506. 
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non-marketing.221 The Court declared the legislation in violation of the 
Community's principle of "legitimate expectations."222 To correct the 
problem, the Council provided the relevant producers a quota at sixty percent of 
the milk delivered in the year preceding the application for non-marketing 
payment, beginning in 1989. The Court in its ruling upheld the plaintiffs 
applications stating that the Community could be held liable under Article 215, 
which requires the Community, in cases of non-contractual liability, to make 
good any damages caused by its institutions or its staff in the performance of 
their duties.223 The Court therefore, ordered the Commission to pay 
compensation to the plaintiffs.224 This group of cases and others similar in 
question appear to have contributed to the increase in agriculture cases before 
the Court in 1992. Also, more generally, continued reforms of the common 
agricultural policy may have done the same. 
The increase in the number of taxation cases in 1992 seems to be in part 
due to a specific question on the legality of a "parafiscal charge on certain 
221 Case 120/86, joined with 104/89 and 37/90 Mulder and Others v Commission and 
Council, judgment on 19 May 1992, Ibid., 423. 
222 The principle of legitimate expectations has been employed in several situations of 
Community case law. In this case, it appears that the milk producers had established 
a "legitimate expectation," or could reasonably expect that they would receive milk 
quotas even though they had agreed to not market milk at the time. The principle of 
legitimate expecations has also been applied to state aide cases. For example, under 
Article 93 (3) of the EEC Treaty, member states must notify the Commission "in 
sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid." 
States have been allowed to by-pass this step by arguing that their was a "legitimate 
expectation" that the aid would be legal. See Further case 303/88 Italy v Commission 
of the European Communities (1991). European Court Reports. 1991, 1435. 
223 EEC Treaty Article 215. in Treaties Establishing the European Communities, 306. 
224 Commission of the European Communities, General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities. 1992, 423. 
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petroleum products in France."225 six cases were brought asking the Court to 
clarify whether a charge "levied by a uniform criterion on both domestic and 
imported products to be used to finance activities for the specific benefit of the 
domestic products on which the charge is levied" is legal under Community 
taxation laws. The Court ruled that if "the benefits fully offset the burden borne 
by the domestic product" then the charge is equivalent to an import duty and is 
prohibited outright.226 Furthermore, if the benefits only partially offset the 
burden on the domestic product, the charge constitutes a discriminatory internal 
tax which is also prohibited by Community law under Articles 12 and 95 of the 
EEC Treaty.227 This particular question on the legality of parafiscal charges 
contributed to the increase in taxation cases and therefore the overall increase in 
Court cases in 1992. While it is unclear yet if 1992 will prove to be a year of 
high numbers of Court cases, the general increase in cases indicates that it may. 
All of the years with high numbers of Court cases, can in part be 
explained by the circumstances and developments in Community law 
surrounding each of those years. As the description of the events in these years 
has illustrated, Community law has developed in fits and spurts over the past 
fifteen years. The number of cases before the Court and the specific issue areas 
involved in those cases seems to reflect both this uneven pattern and perhaps, 
contribute to it. The Court's role as the supreme adjudicating body for 
225
 Ibid., 433. 
226 Ibid., 433. 
222
 Ibid., 433. Article 12 of the EEC Treaty prohibits member states from introducing new 
customs duties on imports or exports or making any changes "having equivalent 
effect." Article 95 similarly, prohibits any internal taxation of any kind on imported 
goods, in excess of that imposed on similar domestic products. Treaties Establishing 
the European Communities. 136. 200. 
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Community law seemingly enables it to contribute to the development of law 
over the years. 
In Figure 5.6 the data on the number of ECJ cases decided has been 
reevaluated to account for the number of member states in the Community in a 
given year. This should control for any increases in case load that may have 
resulted from the accession of new member states. A two year time delay has 
been added to the accession dates, to account for the average of two years it 
takes for a case to be processed through the Court. Again the general trend is 
upward, indicating that the Court’s case load is increasing even when the 
number of member states in the Community is taken into account. Like Figure 
5.5 though, the increase is not unidirectional. 1979, 1982, 1985, 1987, 1988, 
and potentially 1992, have relatively high averages in number of cases per 
member state per year. Again, these heavy case loads can be explained, atleast 
in part, by referring to issue area developments and/or unclear Community 
policies addressed during each of these particular years. 
Figure 5.7 groups the total number of cases in another format. This 
figure shows the average number of ECJ cases heard by the Court prior to the 
Single European Act from 1978 through 1986, compared to after the Single 
European Act from 1987 through 1992. The Court heard an average of 198 
cases per year before the Single European Act (SEA) entered into force. After 
the SEA and through 1992, the Court has heard an average of 299 cases per 
year. This is a clear increase in case load for the Court. By analyzing the data 
in larger time frames like this, anomolous years are averaged in and the larger 
trend becomes visible. 
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From the data provided in Table 5.4 and Figures 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 we infer 
that the Court is hearing more cases over time. This is true if we look only at 
the number of ECJ cases per year or if we account for the number of member 
states in the Community with a two-year time lag for case processing. The 
broader perspective provided by analyzing the average case load of the Court 
prior to and after the Single European Act also shows an increase in case load 
for the Court. From this we can infer that the Court's domain is increasing in 
terms of the number of cases heard by the Court. This indicator, combined with 
a second indicator of the average number of preliminary rulings issued by the 
Court per member state per year (with a two year time lag for case processing), 
will provide a fuller analysis of the Court's domain.228 The initial data is listed 
in Table 5.5, and Figure 5.8 graphs the number of preliminary rulings issued by 
the Court each year. Figure 5.9 shows the average number of preliminary 
rulings issued by the Court per member state per year, with the two year time 
lag. The average number of preliminary rulings prior to the SEA from 1979- 
1986, compared to the average number after the SEA from 1987 through 1992 
is presented in Figure 5.10. 
Figure 5.8 shows the number of preliminary rulings—advisory opinions 
issued by the ECJ to national level courts to provide interpretations of 
Community law or the validity of acts of Community institutions- issued by the 
Court per year gradually increasing. There are some anomolous years, and this 
228 The time it takes for a preliminary rulings to be brought until a ruling is issued by the 
Court is an average of 20 months, which has been rounded to two years here. 
Michael Kenny, staff lawyer for the Court of Justice, telephone interview by author, 
27 May 1993, Luxembourg. 
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Table 5.5. Average number of preliminary rulings per member state per year 
number of 
preliminary 
rulings per 
year 
number of 
member 
states 
number of 
preliminary 
rulings 
per member state 
per year 
1978 n.a. 9 n.a. 
1979 109 9 12.11 
1980 80 9 8.89 
1981 65 9 7.22 
1982 134 9 14.89 
1983 79 10 7.90 
1984 81 10 8.10 
1985 106 10 10.60 
1986 91 10 9.10 
1987 80 10 8.00 
1988 129 12 10.75 
1989 120 12 10.00 
1990 133 12 11.08 
1991 116 12 9.67 
1992 136 12 11.33 
increase is clearly not unidirectional. 1979, 1982, and 1988 each have high 
numbers of preliminary rulings. There also is a distinct jump in the number of 
preliminary rulings between 1987 and 1988. It is perhaps not suprising that the 
years with relatively high numbers of preliminary rulings are also years with 
relatively high numbers of ECJ cases heard by the Court. This is probably due 
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Figure 5.8. Total number of preliminary rulings per year 
to similar developments in Community law affecting both the number of 
preliminary rulings and actual cases.229 
The data presented in Figure 5.9 consist of the average number of 
preliminary rulings per member state per year with a two year time lag for the 
229 The Commission in the General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 
does not provide a break down of preliminary rulings by issue area, so an analysis of 
the years with increased numbers of preliminary rulings is not possible. It seems 
reasonable, however, to expect that the same issue areas that contributed to increases 
in actual ECJ cases also contributed to the increases in preliminary rulings in the 
same years. 
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Figure 5.9. Average number of preliminary rulings per member state per 
year with two year accession date delay 
processing of preliminary rulings.230 Here again, an upward trend in the 
number of preliminary rulings is visible, though it appears more gradual here 
than in Figure 5.8 where the number of member states is not considered. The 
highest number of preliminary rulings per member state took place in 1982. 
More subtle spurts appear in 1979, 1985, 1988, 1990 and potentially 1992. 
When the data are reworked to illustrate the difference in number of 
preliminary rulings before and after the Single European Act, as shown in 
230 The 1978 data on preliminary rulings was not available, so Chart 5.9 and 5.10 begin 
with the 1979 data. 
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Figure 5.10. Average number of preliminary rulings issued by the ECJ 
before and after the Single European Act of 1987 
Figure 5.10, there is a clear jump. In the pre-SEA period from 1979 through 
1986 the Court issued an average of 93 preliminary rulings per year. In the 
post-SEA period from 1987 through 1992, the Court issued an average of 119 
preliminary rulings per year, indicating an increase of approximately 26 rulings 
per year between the two periods. 
The indicator of the number of preliminary rulings issued by the Court 
appears to be increasing according to the data analysis presented here. The raw 
number of preliminary rulings per year shows a gradual increase but with some 
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anomolous years. Accounting for the number of member states in the 
Community with a two-year time delay to allow for case processing time, the 
data shows a gradual increase in the number of preliminary rulings, though at a 
slower rate than was suggested in the previous analysis. There are still 
anomolous years of which 1982 is the most distinct but a general upward trend 
is visible. Analyzing the data in terms of the Single European Act further 
corroborates these results. This analysis indicates an increase in approximately 
26 rulings per year when the SEA went into force in 1987. From all of this 
analysis we can conclude that the number of preliminary rulings issued by the 
Court is increasing. Furthermore, we infer that the domain of the Court is 
increasing according to this indicator. This suggests that the Court is being 
perceived as a more legitimate and/or useful adjudicator by national level 
courts. 
The combined analysis of the two indicators of domain suggests the 
Court's domain is increasing. The Court is hearing more cases and issuing more 
preliminary rulings over time. This is evident when the number of member 
states in the Community is taken into account with a two year time lag is 
allowed for the time needed to process cases and preliminary rulings. The data 
analysis based on pre- and post-SEA periods also indicates that the Court is 
hearing more cases and issuing more preliminary rulings. Still, it is important 
to note that these increases are not unidirectional. Some years demonstrate high 
numbers of cases and preliminary rulings due to new Community legislation 
and/or activity in specific issue areas. Some of the years immediately after 
boom years witness a decline in cases heard and preliminary rulings issued. 
Nonetheless, the broader trend of increased number of cases decided and 
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preliminary rulings issued is evident. This is illustrated in the analysis of both 
average number of cases and number of preliminary rulings before and after the 
Single European Act. 
Conclusion 
From all of the analysis above of both the indicators of scope and 
domain, an assessment of the Court's integration can be made. The slight 
increase in number of issue areas addressed by the Court from 1978 through 
1992 was too small to be relevant. The apparent decrease in the number of non¬ 
government plaintiffs bringing cases to the Court of Justice is also too slight to 
have any real meaning. This suggests that the legitimacy or usefulness of the 
Court is neither increasing nor decreasing for these non-governmental plaintiffs. 
From these two indicators we infer that the scope of the Court is unchanging. 
The domain indicators seem to show stronger results and allow clearer, 
more confident conclusions. The average number of ECJ cases heard per 
member state per year demonstrates an upward trend, though it is important to 
note that it is not unidirectional This suggests that the Court is commanding 
more authority within its established areas of competence. From this we infer 
that the domain of the Court is increasing. The average number of preliminary 
rulings issued by the Court per member state per year corroborates these results. 
Like the number of cases heard by the Court, the number of preliminary rulings 
issued by the Court has increased over time since 1979. There is a relatively 
clear upward trend in preliminary rulings, with the exception of some 
anomolous years that demonstrate high numbers of preliminary rulings, 
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followed by drops in rulings in the years immediately after. This illustrates 
again that the increase is not unidirectional, but rather seems to ebb and flow at 
varying levels. This variation seems to be the result of controversial and 
contentious issue areas which also ebb and flow over the years. From these two 
indicators we infer that the domain of the Court is increasing. This can be 
inferred with a significant degree of confidence since all of the analyses of both 
the number of cases heard by the Court and the number of preliminary rulings 
issued by the Court reinforce this same conclusion. 
The scope and domain of the Court combine to provide an 
operationalized definition of integration. Given the results of our indicators of 
scope and domain, we can determine whether the Court's integration is 
increasing, decreasing, or unchanged. The analyses of unchanging scope and 
increasing domain place the Court most accurately, along a path of build up 
according to the analysis in Chapter Four and neofunctionalist theory as 
articulated by Philippe Schmitter. 
Further conclusions from these analyses will be drawn in the next 
chapter. Chapter Six will lay out some of the implications of this research for 
the Court of Justice and the Community. It will also contain an assessment of 
the possible implications for the EC in global affairs and for international 
relations theory also. Lastly, it will suggest some areas for further research in 
order to understand better integration in the Court and in the EC, and to 
understand better the role of the EC in international affairs. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: 
CONCLUSIONS 
Given the data analysis and findings discussed in Chapter Five, this 
Chapter intends to place the results of this study in the broader context of the 
European Community. The implications of this research for the Court of 
Justice and the European Community will be assessed, along with the broader 
implications for international relations and international relations theory. 
Lastly, some areas for further research which may serve to complement this 
study, will be suggested. 
We found that the two indicators of scope suggested similar results. The 
number of issue areas addressed by the Court of Justice was unchanging and the 
number of non-government plaintiffs bringing cases to the Court was 
unchanging. This conclusion is based on the interpretation that the increase in 
the number of issue areas addressed by the Court and the decrease in non¬ 
government plaintiffs bringing cases to the Court are both too small to be 
significant. 
The results of the indicators of domain of the Court of Justice are less 
ambiguous. Both the average number of cases heard, and preliminary mlings 
issued by the Court of Justice, per member state per year showed an increase 
between 1978 and 1992. From this evidence we inferred that the domain of the 
Court is increasing. Combined, the two dimensions of integration, scope and 
domain, provide an indication of the direction of the Court's integration. 
The integration of the Court of Justice is most accurately placed along the 
path referred to here as build up (refer to Figure 4.1). Build up is a process of 
unchanging scope and increasing domain. This means that the Court's degree of 
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authority is increasing within its areas of competence but that the Court is not 
acquiring new areas of competence. This suggests that the Court has 
established a significant degree of authority within its areas of competence but 
that it has not been able to gain new areas of competence or to attract new non¬ 
government plaintiffs. This further suggests a continued role for the Court 
limited in scope but with real authority within its scope. This may be the result 
of a number of factors. The lack of significant growth in issue areas for the 
Court is directly linked to the scope of the Community. Unless the Community 
has expanded into new areas the Court cannot address new areas. Some 
possible factors involved in the slight decrease in non-government plaintiffs 
bringing cases to the Court have already been discussed in Chapter Five: a 
perception of lost legitimacy and/or usefulness, cost considerations, and fewer 
legal questions relevant to non-government plaintiffs left unanswered. The 
increasing domain of the Court is perhaps, more easily explained. In the 
Treaties the Court is clearly established as the definitive voice on Community 
law. This legal basis for the Court's decisional authority, agreed to by all 
member states, combined with the principles of supremacy of Community law 
over national law and direct effect of Community directives and regulations, 
make it reasonable to expect that the Court would gain decisional authority. 
The acceptance of this authority is perhaps most visible in the increased number 
of preliminary rulings requested by national level courts today. 
From these conclusions on the European Court of Justice's integration 
process and direction we can extrapolate to the Community as a whole. The 
Court serves as a metaphor for the Community in that integration taking place 
in the Community is reflected in the Court. As the Community develops new 
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areas of competence they become part of the Court’s jurisdiction. As the 
Community gains increased levels of authority in those areas of competence, 
the Court gains the authority to rule decisively in those new areas. It is this 
reflective relationship between the Community and the Court that allows us to 
use the Court as a metaphor for change and integration in the Community. 
The results of the research here suggest that the Community, like the 
Court, has increased its decisional authority in issue areas within the 
Community's competence. The Community, though, is not expanding into new 
issue areas as neofunctionalist theory suggests. This may bode ill for the 
Community in the long run if the trend continues because it may be that the 
Community remains only a loose economic zone and does not develop into the 
federation of states anticipated by many. 
Implications for the Court of Justice 
In describing the Court of Justice, one scholar has written: "The Court 
has successfully acted as an unequivocal and indefatigable promoter of 
centralism, uniformity and unification."231 While the author intended this to 
be a criticism of the Court’s activism and biased positions, others consider this 
to be praise for the Court. It is the Court's mission to assure that the Treaties are 
being applied and that progress toward increased unification and integration 
remains the goal of the Community. Whether the Court has overstepped its role 
is a matter of interpretation. From the results of this study, however, it is 
231 Hialte Rasmussen. On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative 
Study in Judicial Policy-Making. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijoff, 1986): 377. 
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reasonable to conclude that the Court is gaining authority in the issue areas in 
which it has competence but it has not been able to expand its competence or 
attract more non-government plaintiffs. 
The increasing domain of the Court of Justice suggests that it may play a 
larger, more decisive role in Community politics in the future. The increased 
degree of authority may even eventually have an impact on the scope of the 
Court, in terms of its ability to attract more non-govemment plaintiffs. If the 
Court is perceived as more effective and authoritative, it may become the court 
of choice for citizens yet. 
The immediate future of the Court appears rather stable. Few changes to 
the Court have been proposed in the Maastricht Treaty. In fact, if anything a 
larger role for the Court could be expected. Amendments to Article 143 of the 
Euratom Treaty provide for lump sum or penalty payments to be imposed on 
member states that do not comply with judgments of the Court regarding the 
failure to fulfill or the incorrect fulfillment of Community obligations under the 
Euratom Treaty.232 This new provision should provide the Court and the 
Community more enforcement ability in seeing that member states fulfill their 
obligations under Community law but only within the scope of the Euratom 
Treaty. 
In terms of new issue areas, the Maastricht Treaty (also known as the 
Treaty on European Union) allows, inter alia, for monetary union among 
member states including the establishment of a European Central Bank, 
increased security and foreign policy cooperation, and a European police force 
232 Treaty on European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1992): 113. 
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(Europol). The role of the Court in these new areas is not yet clear, except that 
the Court has no established role in these policy-making processes delineated in 
the Treaty. 
This research, provides a sense of the Court’s integration progress in the 
past fifteen years. It is a snapshot of the Court's activities intended to illustrate 
recent trends in the Court's scope and domain. It seems evident that the Court is 
a major player in the European Community and changes in the Community are 
visible in the Court. The Court is becoming more integrated in that it's 
authority is increasing within its areas of competence. If this continues to be 
the case, and if more issue areas are added to the Court's competence, we can 
expect that the Court will continue to serve as both a reflection of integration 
occuring throughout the Community and as a major player in the integration 
process. 
Implications for the European Community 
There are many possible implications for the Community that can be 
drawn from the research here. The Maastricht Treaty provides evidence that 
Community efforts will continue to encourage Community growth. This is 
witnessed in its attempts to undertake monetary, foreign, and security policy. 
Continuing efforts at establishing the internal market free of barriers also 
suggest desire for further integration for the Community. The desire for further 
integration is by no means guaranteed though, especially in terms of increased 
scope. The struggles of the Community in trying to gain acceptance of 
Maastricht are evidence of this. In fact the research conducted here may have 
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predicted the difficulty currently being experienced in the European 
Community in trying to gain passage of the Maastricht Treaty. We could have 
expected, based on the trends visible in the analysis of scope indicators 
conducted here, that acceptance of Community control over even more sensitive 
issue areas like defense and foreign policy contained in the Maastricht Treaty 
would be difficult. 
If the Maastricht Treaty is ratified, the future of the Community’s degree 
of authority within these areas is also not certain. Issue areas such as foreign 
policy strike closer to home for member states and the extent to which they will 
be willing to surrender decisional authority is unknown. Judging on past and 
current trends evidenced in the Court of Justice, however, it seems reasonable to 
expect that the Maastricht Treaty will continue to be stalled as states hesitate to 
delegate authority in new issue areas. 
The potential for Community expansion in terms of accession of new 
member states seems likely. This outward expansion may slow internal 
integration, though, as efforts to assimulate new member states may take 
precedence. Indeed, it has been suggested that it is for this reason that new 
member states have not been admitted since 1986, in order to focus Community 
energies soley on internal integration. Whether or not these two dimensions of 
Community growth will remain competing interests in the minds of Community 
players is yet to be seen. 
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Implications for International Relations 
The internal integration of the Community poses many interesting 
possibilities for the international community. If the Community continues to 
become stronger internally and if the relations of member states continue to 
become more closely intertwined in economic areas, the Community can be 
expected to play an even larger role in international economic affairs than it 
plays today. This is especially true if the Maastricht Treaty is ratified and 
European monetary union becomes a reality. Furthermore, if the member states 
also are able to reach common ground in foreign and security policy areas, the 
Community could become a stronger player in international relations defined as 
military power politics. Pooled foreign and security policy still seems more of a 
possibility than a probability, but its potential merits acknowledgement. 
If instead, the member states are unable to agree to a Maastricht Treaty, 
the Community could see its growth in scope stunted permanently. If the 
Community does not gain competence in new issue areas, it will remain as it is 
today, a loose economic and free trade zone, assuming the elimination of 
market barriers is completed. The difficulties experienced by Maastricht so far 
and the extent to which it has been altered to accomodate hesitating member 
states, suggest that even if the Maastricht Treaty is ratified, it may affect little 
change. 
The results of the research done here suggest that the Community has 
steadily increased its degree of authority in the areas of competence set aside for 
it by the member states. It seems reasonable to expect that this trend will 
continue given the extent to which member states have already surrendered 
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authority and given the nature of the issue areas surrendered. The issue areas 
proposed in the Maastricht Treaty however, are of a much more sensitive 
nature, and therefore probably will not be surrendered so easily. Historical 
conflicts among member states which have proven difficult to over come in the 
past may prove insurmountable in security and foreign policy debates. For 
reasons such as this, qualifications must be added to any optimistic statements 
about continued European integration. More sensitive issue areas such as this 
will likely slow, if not stop, integration efforts for some time. The sensitive 
nature of these new issue areas combined with the results of the study here, 
suggest that the Community may continue to not see growth in scope in the 
foreseeable future. 
The potential outward expansion of the Community adds yet another 
dimension to its future role in international relations. If non-member states 
continue to perceive membership in the Community as beneficial, we can 
expect that the Community will continue to expand geographically (if it so 
desires). The current accession procedures with Norway, Finland and Austria 
appear to be just the beginning. It has been speculated that some of the 
formerly Eastern bloc countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary 
may apply to the EC in the near future. In fact, on June 22nd of this year the 
Community extended a public invitation to six former Soviet-bloc countries: 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.233 A 
target date was not set, and it was acknowledged that these countries would 
probably not be ready for accession before 2000.234 if this proves to be the 
233 Alan Riding, "European Community Sets Terms for 6 Former Soviet Allies to Join," 
The New York Times. 23 June 1993, A5. 
234 Ibid., A5. 
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case, the Community could potentially increase from twelve member states to 
as many as twenty-two. While this would certainly take place over a number of 
years, the potential for a European Community of that size and stature is worth 
considering. The Community already accounts for 345 million people, and 
makes up approximately twenty percent of global markets in exports and 
imports of goods and services.235 A more integrated, larger Community could 
become the major economic player in international economic affairs if 
expansion trends continue. This increased stature could also bolster the 
Community in military relations and power politics if efforts at coordinating 
and pooling sovereignty in security and foreign policy areas are successful. As 
mentioned above though, geographical expansion and internal integration are 
competing goals, which are difficult to pursue simultaneously. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that the redirecting of efforts toward geographical expansion 
signals a loss of continued effort toward internal integration. 
The increased integration that has occurred in the Court and the 
Community has not been unidirectional. Community integration has ebbed and 
flowed as different issues have been debated, as different individuals have lead 
the process, and as the environment in which the integration process takes 
place, has changed. This contradicts the proposition of functionlist theorists 
discussed earlier in Chapter Two, that economic spillover is a "never ending 
domino effect inevitably leading to more and more integration."236 While 
neofunctionlism anticipates a "cumulative and expansive process whereby the 
235 Eurostat. 232. 
236 Lindberg. Europe's Would-Be Polity. 118. 
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supranational agency slowly extends its authority so as to progressively 
undermine the independence of the nation-state," neofunctionlists also 
acknowledge that this process may include periods of spillback, retrenchment, 
and muddling about.237 This is the discontinuity of the formal integration 
process described by William Wallace, rather than the continuous process 
associated with informal integration.238 The uneven growth visible in the 
indicators analyzed here suggests that this has been the case for the Court and 
the Community. 
The likelihood of the Community becoming a federalist state still seems 
minimal. Although the argument against the EC being classified as a federalist 
state because the member states still retain a "hard core of sovereignty," may be 
weakened by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty does not entail 
a complete surrender of sovereignty to the Community. In fact the Treaty as it 
exists today is a much watered-down version of the Treaty originally 
considered. Also the research here indicates that while the Community is 
increasing its degree of authority within the issue areas in its competence, it has 
only slowly gained new areas, and has not been able to attract new non¬ 
government plaintiffs. This may suggest that the Community's role will 
continue to be limited if its constituents continue to hesitate in delegating more 
issue areas to the EC. 
The belief by communications theorists that a security community does 
not require a "high level of interdependence or central political organizations to 
enforce joint decisions," makes this theoretical foundation inaccurate for the 
237
 Ibid., 7. 
238 Wallace, The Dynamics of European Integration, 9. 
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European Community. This would require the community to exist without the 
need for a legal system and without the institutional framework already firmly 
established in the EC. The fact that the Court has grown in terms of the number 
of cases it addresses and the number of preliminary rulings it issues to member 
state courts, and the fact that the Court is increasingly hearing cases to ensure 
member states are fulfilling their obligations to the Community indicate that a 
security community without enforcement capabilities as described by Karl 
Deutsch is not likely to evolve in the foreseeable future. 
Areas for Further Research 
There are many research questions related to the one addressed here, that 
merit serious inquiry. The first question for further research addresses the 
probable duality of the role of the Court in European Community integration. 
Whether or not, in addition to reflecting integration initiated elsewhere in the 
Community, the Court also acts as an integrating factor itself should be studied. 
From the research in this study, it seems that there is a strong possibility that the 
Court does indeed play this dual role, in a symbiotic relationship with the 
Community. 
Additional research to test the propositions of neofunctionalist theory 
should be done. Neofunctionlists also advocate the position that spillover 
occurs due to internal pressures to integrate. The extent to which those 
individuals and groups directly impacted by the activities of the Court of Justice 
desire continued Community integration would provide insight into this 
neofunctionalist proposition. Called "elite value complimentarity" by Phillipe 
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Schmitter, this aspect of the Court’s and Community's integration has not been 
researched. 
In terms of the research conducted here, an analysis to determine by 
member state who is bringing cases to the Court of Justice could enhance the 
study. This could identify which member states bring the most cases to the 
Court. Also, a break down of which member states are brought before the 
Court for not fulfilling their obligations under Article 169 could provide insight 
as to which member states are less committed to Community policies. 
The research done here could also be complemented by a study of the 
characteristics of the "legal actors and judicial organs themselves: their 
personal composition, recruitment, self-perception of role, representability, 
accessibility and legitimacy of function."239 The perceived legitimacy of the 
Court by non-government plaintiffs and by the national courts of member states 
was analyzed in the indicators considered here, but the other characteristics 
suggested by Joseph Weiler were not due to time and space constraints. 
All of these areas for further research would contribute to a better 
understanding of the European Community as it exists today and as it may exist 
tomorrow. The increased degree of authority experienced by the Court and the 
Community over the past fifteen years suggests that the Community will 
continue to play a major role in the activities of its member states and in 
international relations. The Community's inability to grow in terms of issue 
areas and constituents suggests that its growth in scope is neither automatic nor 
guaranteed and appears to be stalled. The immediate future of the Community 
239 Weiler, "Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the Law Relevant?," 
56. 
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probably can be expected to continue with these current trends but because the 
integration process is not necessarily smooth or continuous, it is difficult to 
anticipate what will happen next. As one scholar warns: "One must never 
forget that international integration is an innovative and experimental process. 
It takes place in an ambiance of considerable uncertainty and trepidation."240 
240 Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration," 849. 
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